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California Supreme Court Survey
August 1984-November 1984
The Calfornia Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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Proposed ballot initiative for a balanced federal
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Putative spouse entitled to share of decedent's
separate property: Estate of Leslie .................... 872
XI. LABOR RELATIONS ..................................... 876
Regulation requiring employer to give list of
employees to labor organization upheld; not
necessary to prove both intent and effect in charging
employer with interfering with employees' rights:
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California Coastal Act does not preclude public
referendum on local land use measures: Yost v.
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Actual malice does not exist where the source of the
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representatives before proposing charter
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Seal Beach ............................................ 879
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XVI. RENT CONTROL ......................................... 882
Ordinance requiring a permit to demolish an
apartment building held not a deprivation of due
process: Nash v. City of Santa Monica ................. 882
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writ of review denied by appellate court: Johnson v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ................. 886
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. When a case is submitted to jury for special verdicts,
all jurors may participate in each special verdict:
Resch v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
In Resch v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 676, 685 P.2d
1178, 205 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1984), the supreme court was asked to untan-
gle a mathematical riddle created when jurors in a personal injury
action were inconsistent among themselves on special verdicts for an
automobile manufacturer. The court, in holding that all jurors may
participate in each special verdict, attempted to avoid the potentially
anomalous effects of applying an "identical nine" rule in multiple is-
sue cases.
In Resch, the jury passed special verdicts on three issues related to
manufacturer liability. All jurors agreed the automobile was free of
design defects, nine of the twelve found a manufacturing defect, but
ten of the twelve found that the manufacturing defect was not a sub-
stantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury. Only seven of the ju-
rors finding a manufacturing defect also found that the defect was
not a substantial factor in the injuries, meaning that three of the ten
jurors voting on the substantiality issue had concluded there was no
defect in the automobile at all. The plaintiff moved for a mistrial on
the theory that the verdict was improper unless the identical nine ju-
rors who found there was a manufacturing defect also found a lack of
causation.
The anomaly lay in the fact that the following results were possi-
ble in a multiple issue trial if the "identical nine" rule was applied.
A finding in favor of the plaintiff on the first issue by nine of twelve
jurors would require the same nine to agree on the second issue in
order to render judgment for the plaintiff. The three dissenting ju-
rors would be deprived of one-half their voting power on the second
issue since a vote for the plaintiff on the second issue would have no
effect as only the initial nine jurors could make any difference as to
the second issue. However, a vote for the defendant on the second
issue might have an effect since any swing vote from the original ma-
jority would destroy the plaintiff's verdict.
To avoid this situation, the court held that all jurors could partici-
pate in deliberations on all issues and that for a verdict to be ren-
dered for a party, it was not necessary for the identical nine jurors to
agree on all issues of the trial. In so holding, the court relied heavily
on the reasoning outlined in Juarez v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 759,
647 P.2d 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982).
In Juarez, the supreme court held that there was no reason to ad-
here to an "identical nine" rule since such a rule would operate to
deny the parties to a lawsuit the right to a jury of twelve persons de-
liberating on all issues. Allowing all twelve jurors to deliberate on
all issues would also further a policy of judicial efficiency, avoiding
hung juries.
The effect of this decision will be to allow jurors to participate in
all aspects of jury deliberations, streamlining the trial process and
avoiding hung juries.
B. Civil Code section 394 allows appointment of a neutral
judge to resolve a trust issue where residence and doing
business requirements are met: San Francisco
Foundation v. Superior Court.
In San Francisco Foundation v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 285, 690
P.2d 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1984), a unanimous supreme court, pursuant
to Civil Code section 394, granted a writ ordering the superior court
to appoint a disinterested judge from a neutral county to resolve a
trust issue.
The petitioner, trustee of a foundation, sought to modify the terms
of a charitable testamentary trust established for a specific county.
The county responded by opposing the modifications and sought the
removal of the trustee. The trustee, in turn, filed a motion for the
transfer of the trust proceedings to a neutral county, or in the alter-
native, appointment of a disinterested judge from a neutral county to
hear the trust issues.
Over the objections of the county, the supreme court held that sec-
tions 1123.5 and 1123.7 of the Probate Code did not preclude an appli-
cation of section 394 of the Civil Code. Section 394 provides that,
whenever an action or proceeding is brought by a county against a
corporation doing business in another county, the action or proceed-
ing must be, on motion of either party, transferred to another county
or, if the action or proceeding is one in which a jury is not a matter of
right, in lieu of transferring the case, the court in the original county
may request the chairperson of the judicial council to assign a disin-
terested judge from a neutral county to hear the proceedings.
The court first concluded that the proceeding was one in which a
jury was a matter of right. It then determined that the litigation be-
tween the county and foundation over whether to modify the trust
was a "proceeding brought by the county." Although the foundation
[Vol. 12: 789, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
was the first party to file documents in the case, the court concluded
it had not filed against the county, but had merely requested instruc-
tions from the probate court. Inasmuch as it was the county that
filed documents in opposition to the petition, and for removal of the
trustee, the county had "brought" the action against the petitioner.
Moreover, the court determined that the foundation qualified as "a
resident of another county." This residency requirement had been
met because the trustee had filed a statement with the secretary of
state under Corporations Code section 24003, listing its office in an-
other county as its principal office. The statement was filed the same
day the motion for assignment of a disinterested judge was filed,
however, the court determined that the right of a moving party for
change of venue depended upon conditions existing at the time the
demand is made.
In addition to a literal compliance with the residence requirement,
the nature and extent of the foundation's activities within the forum
county were not so involved that the foundation was reasonably
likely to be viewed as having a close relationship with the forum
county. As the county had created an atmosphere of hostility be-
tween the foundation and the beneficiaries of the forum county, the
court concluded the foundation was likely to be viewed as an
outsider.
Having met the filing and doing business requirements of Civil
Code section 394, the supreme court granted the writ requiring the
appointment of a neutral judge to preside over the trust issues.
II. CONSERVATORSHIP
Court appointing conservator has continuing jurisdiction
over conservatee until discharge: In re Gandolfo.
In In re Gandolfo, 36 Cal. 3d 889, 686 P.2d 669, 206 Cal. Rptr. 149
(1984), the conservatee, by court order, had been committed to an in-
stitution for the gravely and developmentally disabled pursuant to
the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 5000-5500 (West Supp. 1984). Thereafter, on several
occasions, he sought release by another trial court also having juris-
diction. That court eventually granted the conservatee's request for a
writ of habeas corpus.
In determining whether it was proper for a trial court to grant a
writ of habeas corpus in the face of an order by another trial court,
the supreme court placed great reliance upon Browne v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593, 107 P.2d 1 (1940). As a result, the court held
that where several courts have concurrent jurisdiction in a guardian-
ship proceeding, the first one to assume and exercise jurisdiction ac-
quires exclusive jurisdiction.
Additionally, the court held that the LPS Act provided adequate
statutory review mechanisms. Other appropriate remedies are pro-
vided under the LPS Act, therefore, habeas corpus was not a proper
remedy.
Accordingly, the order granting habeas corpus was reversed.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Proposed ballot initiative for a balanced federal budget
amendment held unconstitutional: AFL-CIO v. March
Fong Eu.
I. INTRODUCTION
In AFL-CIO v. March Fong Eu,' the petitioners petitioned the
supreme court for writs of mandate to prevent the Secretary of State
from instituting measures preparatory to placing on the November,
1984 ballot an initiative measure entitled Balanced Federal Budget
Statutory Initiative. The purpose of the proposed initiative was to
compel the California Legislature, on penalty of loss of salary, to ap-
ply to Congress to convene a constitutional convention for the sole
purpose of amending the United States Constitution to require a bal-
anced federal budget.2 In the event that the legislature failed to act,
the Secretary of State would be obligated to apply directly to Con-
gress on behalf of the people of California.3
The supreme court, in determining whether to issue the writs of
mandate, examined the propriety of the initiative in view of article V
of the United States Constitution4 and article II, section 8 and article
1. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, stay denied sub nom Uhler v.
AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (1984). Opinion by Broussard, J., with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Reynoso
and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring opinion by Kaus, J. Separate dissent-
ing opinion by Lucas, J.
2. Id. at 691, 686 P.2d at 611, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
3. Id,
4. The proposed initiative was brought pursuant to article V of the United States
Constitution, which provides two alternative means of proposing constitutional amend-
ments. It provides in relevant part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof,
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
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IV, section 1 of the California Constitution.5
II. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the need for a balanced federal budget has been of
utmost concern to many Americans. The enactment of a constitu-
tional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget has been
urged by President Reagan and many others.6 While numerous bills
have been introduced in Congress, none have been approved and sub-
mitted to the states for ratification.7
Proponents of a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced
federal budget sought to avoid the necessity for congressional ap-
proval by resorting to the alternative method of proposing constitu-
tional amendments by a convention called upon application of two-
thirds of the states.8
Proponents in California have regularly introduced resolutions to
the legislature calling for a convention to propose a balanced budget
amendment. 9 While the legislature has held hearings on these meas-
ures, it has declined to approve any resolution for a constitutional
convention.10 Supporters of a balanced budget amendment now seek
to compel action by the California Legislature by popular initiative."
III. ANALYSIS
A. Propriety of Preelection Review
Preliminary to addressing the constitutional propriety of the pro-
posed ballot initiative, the supreme court examined whether a pre-
election review was the proper time to address the constitutional
challenges to the initiative. Absent some clear showing of invalidity,
it is the general rule to deter from constitutional review and other
challenges to a ballot initiative until after the electoral process in or-
5. Article II, section 8 of the California Constitution states in pertinent part:
"The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the
Constitution and to adopt or reject them." Article IV, section 1 of the California Con-
stitution states: "The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legisla-
ture which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum."
6. 36 Cal. 3d at 691, 686 P.2d at 611, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
7. Id. at 691-92, 686 P.2d at 611, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
9. 36 Cal. 3d at 692, 686 P.2d at 612, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
10. Id.
11. Id:
der to permit the exercise of the people's franchise. 12 Where the
power 13 of the people to enact the proposal in the first place is in is-
sue, rather than the substance14 of the initiative, preelection review is
proper inasmuch as, if the initiative is invalid, it must be excluded
from the ballot.'5
Since the petitioner's challenge involved the power of the people to
adopt the proposed initiative under article V of the United States
Constitution' 6 and article II, section 8 of the California Constitu-
tion,17 preelection review of the proposed balanced budget initiative
was proper.' 8
B. Issues Arising under Article V of the United States Constitution
The court first briefly discussed the contention raised by amici cu-
riae that none of the federal constitutional issues raised were justicia-
ble as "[t]he [amending] process itself is 'political' in its entirety from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point."' 9 Contrary to the argument presented by amici, the court
found authority in the case of Hawke v. Smith2o for the provision
that a court can remove a proposal from a state election ballot on the
ground it does not conform to article V.21
Concluding, therefore, that the issues raised by the petitioners
were indeed justiciable, the court turned to the task of interpreting
12. Brosnahan v. March Fong Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr.
100, 101 (1982). This "general rule favoring postelection review contemplates that no
serious consequences will result if consideration of the validity of a measure is delayed
until after an election .... If the measure passes, there will be ample time to rule on
its validity. If it fails, judicial action will not be required." Legislature of Cal. v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 666, 669 P.2d 17, 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784-85 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129-34, 222 P.2d 225, 228-30 (1950);
Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, 86 Cal. App. 3d 506, 509-12, 150 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327-29
(1978).
14. See, e.g., Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 328-29, 431 P.2d 650, 652-53, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 26, 28-29 (1967).
15. Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 7, 641 P.2d at 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting). See also Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 666-67, 669 P.2d at 20-21,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. 36 Cal. 3d at 696, 686 P.2d at 614-15, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
19. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 459 (1939) (Black, J., concurring). But see
Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1123-46 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub nom.
National Org. of Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,
1299-1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Article V Con-
stitutional Conventions, 58 TEx. L. REV. 131, 158-62 (1979) (discussing Coleman v.
Miller).
20. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
21. Id.
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whether the language of article V permitted the adoption of a resolu-
tion for a balanced federal budget by the people.
Article V provides that "[t]he Congress . . . on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Con-
vention for proposing Amendments .... "22 Additionally, the term
"Legislatures" also appears in that portion of Article V which speci-
fies that an amendment becomes "valid to all Intents and Purposes
• . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
states."
23
In determining whether the term "Legislatures" as used in article
V referred to a representative body selected by the people of a state
or to the people of a state, the supreme court relied on the rationale
and holdings enunciated in Barlotti v. Lyons24 and Hawke v. Smith25
that "Legislatures" referred to a representative body chosen by the
people. It was noted that "in view of the initiative and referendum
provisions, [wherein] the people of the state may constitute a part of
the law making power of the state, they certainly are not a part of
'the legislature' within the meaning of that term as used in our [Cali-
fornia] constitution. ' 26 Further evidence that the term "Legislature"
did not mean the people of a state was found in a review of the use of
the term in the United States Constitution. Both Hawke and Barlotti
observed that in all cases it clearly appeared "Legislatures" meant a
legislative body.27
Lastly, although the cases which construed the term "Legislatures"
referred to the role of the legislature in ratifying, not in proposing,
22. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
24. 182 Cal. 575, 189 P. 282 (1920).
25. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
26. 182 Cal. at 578-79, 189 P. at 283-84.
27. 253 U.S. at 227-28; 182 Cal. at 579-81, 189 P. at 283-84. Article I, section 2
prescribes the qualifications of electors of congressmen as those "requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the state legislature;" former article I, section 3 pro-
vided that senators should be chosen in each state by the legislature thereof. This was
the method of choosing senators until the adoption of the seventeenth amendment,
which made a provision for the election of senators by vote of the people; article IV
requires the United States to protect every state against domestic violence upon appli-
cation of the legislature, or of the Executive when the legislature cannot be convened;
article VI requires the members of the several legislatures to be bound by oath, or af-
firmation, to support the Constitution of the United States; in article I, section 8, Con-
gress is given exclusive jurisdiction over all places purchased by the consent of the
legislature of the state in which the same shall be; article IV, section 3 provides that no
new states shall be carved out of old states without the consent of the legislatures of
the states concerned.
constitutional amendments, the court held the term "Legislatures"
bore the same meaning throughout article V.28
Since section 3 of the proposed Balanced Budget Initiative stated
that the people adopt a resolution calling for a constitutional conven-
tion, and stated that in the event the legislature failed to adopt the
resolution within forty legislative days, the Secretary of State was ob-
ligated to transmit the resolution adopted by the people, it appeared
clear to the court that the method prescribed in article V had not
been followed.29
While the people could not directly adopt a resolution calling for a
Balanced Federal Budget Amendment, the court did observe that the
initiative called for direct action by the people if the legislature failed
to act.3 0 The main thrust of the initiative was to command the legis-
lature to adopt a resolution applying for a constitutional convention.
The issue then became whether pro forma action by a state legisla-
ture, acting under the mandate of an initiative measure, was suffi-
cient to comply with article V.31 This question was answered in the
negative. Acting upon the analysis of the federal Constitution set out
in Barlotti3 2 and Hawke,33 the supreme court concluded that "a state
may not, by initiative or otherwise, compel its legislators to apply for
a constitutional convention.. . . Under article V, the legislators must
be free to vote their own judgment, being responsible to their constit-
uents through the electoral process."3 4 To the extent that the initia-
tive mandated the California Legislature to apply to Congress for a
constitutional convention, it violated article V of the United States
Constitution.35
C. Issues Arising Under the California Constitution
In determining whether the Balanced Federal Budget Initiative
passed scrutiny under the California Constitution, the supreme court
first looked to article IV, section 1, which provides: "[t]he legislative
power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which con-
sists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to them-
selves the powers of initiative and referendum."36
28. 36 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 686 P.2d at 620, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See also Bonfield,
Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 659,
665 (1963-64); Ervin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of
Amending the Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 889 (1968).
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 686 P.2d at 620, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
30. Id at 704, 686 P.2d at 620, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
31. Id
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. 36 Cal. 3d at 706, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
35. Id
36. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Article II, section 8, subdivision (a) defines an initiative as "the
power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the
Constitution and to adopt or reject them."37 Article II, section 9, sub-
division (a) defines referendum as "the power of the electors to ap-
prove or reject statutes."3 8
In view of the above, the question facing the court was whether the
Balanced Budget Initiative proposed to adopt a "statute" within the
meaning of article II of the constitution.3 9 Mindful of the court's
"duty to jealously guard the people's right of initiative and referen-
dum,"40 the supreme court set out to interpret the term "statutes."
Although the initiative specifically called for a "resolution," the
court's analysis looked beyond the form of a resolution to determine
if it was in substance a statute4' or a resolution.42
The court noted that, both historically and modernly, the power of
initiative and referendum was limited to such measures as "consti-
tuted the exercise of legislative power to create binding law-the
kind of measure that would be introduced by a bill, duly passed by
both houses of the legislature, and presented to the governor for sig-
nature.'43 Having set forth the parameters upon which a "resolu-
tion" will be deemed in substance a "statute," the supreme court
turned to the three substantive sections of the initiative to determine
whether the initiative enacted a "statute." All three sections were
deemed invalid.
37. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
38. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
39. 36 Cal. 3d at 708, 686 P.2d at 623, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
40. Id. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241 (1978); As-
sociated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570, 572 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.3
(1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976); Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258,
101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972); Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563-64, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 344 (1961); Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal. App. 2d 115, 117, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309
(1959).
41. "A statute declares law; if enacted by the Legislature it must be initiated by a
bill, passed with certain formalities and presented to the governor for signature." 36
Cal. 3d at 708-09, 686 P.2d at 623, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (citations omitted).
42. A resolution merely expresses the views of the resolving body, and does not
require the formalities required to enact a statute. Id. But see Hopping v. Council of
Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915) (wherein a "resolution" which in substance
enacted a law was subject to referendum).
43. 36 Cal. 3d at 713-14, 686 P.2d at 627, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 107. See also Whittemore
v. Terral, 140 Ark. 493, 498-99, 215 S.W. 686, 688 (1919); Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me.
544, 549-50, 107 A. 673, 676 (1919); Decher v. Secretary of State, 209 Mich. 565, 576-77,
177 N.W. 388, 392 (1920); Herbring v. Brown, 92 Or. 176, 180-82, 180 P. 328, 330 (1919).
Section 1 of the initiative mandated the legislature to adopt a reso-
lution calling upon Congress to propose a balanced budget amend-
ment and apply for a constitutional convention. Under the court's
analysis, the resolution was "in part a simple declaration of policy,
without statutory implementation, and in part a step in a federal pro-
cess which may eventually lead to amendment of the federal Consti-
tution."44 It neither created a law nor adopted a statute within the
meaning of article II of the California Constitution.
Section 2 of the initiative, which provided that if the legislature did
not comply with section 1 within twenty legislative days, the legisla-
tors' salary would be suspended, was held by the court to be simply a
sanction, and invalid as it was an integral part of section 1.45
Lastly, section 3, which provided for the adoption of the resolution
by the people, and directed the Secretary of State to transmit the res-
olution to Congress if the legislature failed to adopt it within twenty
days was also invalid under article II as it merely called for the adop-
tion of a resolution and not a statute.46
IV. CONCLUSION
As all three sections of the Balanced Federal Budget Initiative
failed to adopt a statute within the meaning of article II of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, and did not come within the meaning of article V
of the United States Constitution, the court issued a peremptory writ
of mandate commanding the Secretary of State not to take any action
to place the proposed Balanced Budget Initiative on the November 6,
1984, General Election Ballot.47
IV. CONTRACT LAW
Court creates cause of action in tort against a party who
breaches a contract and then in bad faith denies the
contract's existence: Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co. of California.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co. of Califor-
nia, 1 the supreme court considered whether, and under what circum-
stances, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
44. 36 Cal. 3d at 714, 686 P.2d at 627-28, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
45. Id. at 714-15, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
46. Id. at 715, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
47. Id. at 716, 686 P.2d at 629, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
1. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Opinion by the court
(Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, JJ.). Separate concurring and dissenting
opinion by Bird, C.J.
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dealing in a commercial contract might give rise to an action in tort.2
The court, over an objection by Chief Justice Rose Bird,3 declined to
extend tort liability based on a breach of the implied covenant;
rather, it held that an action in tort may exist when a party breach-
ing a contract seeks to shield itself from liability by a bad faith denial
of the existence of the contract.4 The court reasoned it unnecessary
to predicate liability on a breach of the implied covenant.5
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
In the early 1970's, the City of Eureka decided to condemn decrepit
waterfront property in order to develop a more modern marina. Ap-
pellant Seaman's Direct Buying Service (Seaman's) operated as a
dealer in ship supplies and equipment on property which the city
sought to condemn and saw the condemnation as an opportunity to
expand and modernize its own business. To that end, Seaman's pro-
posed to lease a large portion of the redevelopment area, part of
which it would use for its own operations, the other part of which it
would sublease to other interests. Seaman's and the City signed an
initial lease for a small area, with the understanding that the lease
could be renegotiated to include the larger area conditioned upon a
showing of financial responsibility by Seaman's to the City. A major
element of this condition was Seaman's operation of a modern
marine fuel dealership. Seaman's sought agreements with major oil
companies and finally reached a letter of agreement, dated October
11, 1972, with Standard Oil Company of California (Standard). This
letter was presented to the City and shortly thereafter the City and
Seaman's signed a forty-year lease for the entire area Seaman's had
sought. Things then took a turn for the worse, prompting this
litigation.
At the end of 1972, Standard was forced to adopt a policy restrict-
ing new business. Since it as yet had not delivered any marine fuel to
Seaman's and was subsequently subject to federal regulations man-
2. Id. at 758, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
3. Id. at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
4. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
5. Indeed, it is not even necessary to predicate liability on a breach of the
implied covenant. It is sufficient to recognize that a party to a contract may
incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to
shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause,
that the contract exists.
Id.
dating allocation of petroleum products among present customers,
Standard indicated to Seaman's that it could not supply Seaman's
with fuel, as it had not supplied Seaman's in 1972. Seaman's was able
to obtain a supply order from the controlling federal agency and
presented it to Standard, who then began contending that no binding
agreement had been reached. Standard appealed the supply order on
that basis. The order was withdrawn by the agency and Seaman's ap-
pealed that decision and was successful, with the proviso that Sea-
man's had to provide a court decree that a valid contract existed
between Standard and Seaman's. Seaman's asked Standard to stipu-
late to the existence of the contract since it could not continue opera-
tions without fuel during the period of time a trial on the contract
issue would take. Standard refused. Seaman's subsequently went out
of business and filed this suit.
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The court dealt with two issues preliminary to discussing breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Before a breach
of the covenant could occur, the court had to decide whether the let-
ter of agreement of October 11, 1972 was sufficient to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds and additionally, whether intent is an element of a
cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations.
A. Statute of Frauds
Under California Civil Code section 1624,6 an agreement not to be
performed within one year will be deemed invalid unless "some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to
be charged or by his agent." 7 As the court noted, the writing must
" 'contain the essential elements of a specific, consummated agree-
ment.' " What is "essential" depends on the agreement itself, the
context in which it arose, and the conduct of the parties.9
Under the facts in this case, the court easily found that the statute
of frauds had been satisfied and that a valid contract existed between
the parties.10 The October 11, 1972 letter of agreement from Stan-
dard to Seaman's proposed that: (1) the parties would sign a Chevron
Marine Dealer agreement for a ten-year term; (2) Standard would ad-
vance the cost of building new fueling facilities; (3) Standard would
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1973).
7. Id.
8. 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (quoting Franklin v.
Hansen, 59 Cal. 2d 570, 574, 381 P.2d 386, 388, 30 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (1963)).
9. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 comment g (1981)).
10. "The evidence leaves no doubt a contract was made. The requirements of the
statute of frauds were more than adequately met here." Id. at 765, 686 P.2d at 1164,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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sell the fuel to Seaman's at a discount from the posted price; and (4)
the parties would sign an agreement providing Standard with the
right to cure upon default by Seaman's."
Standard contended that the letter was not sufficiently precise in
terms of price, parties, and quantity to fulfill the statute of frauds re-
quirements. This argument was easily rejected by the court.12 The
parties were clearly indicated, and the provision for sale of fuel at a
discount from the posted price was found to clearly indicate price.
The court found, in addition, that as a dealership agreement, the
parties had entered into a contract whereby the seller (Standard)
would supply the buyer (Seaman's), with as much fuel as the buyer
required. Such an agreement was found to be a requirements con-
tract.13 Requirements contracts were found to be enforced by courts
without much problem.'4 Since they are precise enough to be en-
forced, they are precise enough to satisfy the statute of frauds.15
The court, having determined that the October 11th letter satisfied
the Civil Code statute of frauds, then turned its discussion to the stat-
ute of frauds requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).16 It was necessary to consider the U.C.C. because the letter
evidenced a contract for the sale of "goods."1 7 Standard contended
once more that the letter failed the U.C.C. version of the statute of
frauds because a quantity term was not specified. The court, how-
ever, noted that requirements contracts are sufficient to satisfy the
11. Id. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
12. Id. at 763, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The court reasoned that the
letter contained the elements of parties and price. The letter "evidences an agreement
• . . that Seaman's would become a 'Chevron,' i.e., Standard dealer." Id. Thus the
court took as evidence that the parties were properly identified. Further, the agree-
ment that the price was to be set by discounting the posted price by 4.5 cents was seen
as a price term. Id at 763, 686 P.2d at 1162-63, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
13. The court reasoned that as the letter was an agreement that the parties were
to enter into a dealership arrangement, "[t]he obvious implication of such an arrange-
ment is that [Standard] will supply as much fuel as [Seaman's] requires." Id. at 763,
686 P.2d at 1163, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
14. Fisher v. Parsons, 213 Cal. App. 2d 829, 834, 29 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212-13 (1963).
15. 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201:113 (3d ed. 1982).
16. CAL. COM. CODE § 2201 (West 1964).
17. 36 Cal. 3d at 764, 686 P.2d at 1163, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The court gave no
authority for its statement that fuel or gasoline falls within the definition of "goods" in
the U.C.C. In Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1977), however, the supreme court dealt with the issue in a footnote, deciding conclu-
sively that gasoline fell within the definition of "goods" in the Commercial Code. Id. ' '
at 98 n.3, 569 P.2d at 756 n.3, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.3 (citing Amoco Pipeline Co. v. '
Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 116 (10th Cir. 1974)).
U.C.C.'s statute of frauds.1 8
B. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
The court next considered the role of intent or motive in the tort
of intentional interference with contractual relations. Standard con-
tended that the purpose or motive for interfering with Seaman's con-
tract with the City of Eureka was critical in finding liability.
Seaman's, on the other hand, asserted that Standard's purpose was ir-
relevant. Seaman's insisted that a belief to a substantial certainty
held by Standard that its acts would interfere with Seaman's contract
would be enough to sustain liability. The court rejected both argu-
ments however, stating it felt both parties suffered confusion about
the tort.19
The court early on described the role of intent in the case of Impe-
rial Ice Co. v. Rossier2o when it said that "[t]he act of inducing the
breach must be an intentional one. If the actor had no knowledge..
. of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce a breach,
he cannot be held liable though an actual breach results from his
lawful and proper acts." 21 As the court in Seaman's properly rea-
soned, "[i]t is not enough that the actor intended to perform the acts
which caused the result-he or she must have intended to cause the
result itself."22 In such an action, therefore, it is essential that the
plaintiff plead and prove the defendant intended to induce a breach
of contract,23 or, in the case of an action for interference with pro-
spective economic advantage, the plaintiff must plead and prove "in-
tentional acts. . . designed to disrupt the relationship."2 4
Once the intent of the defendant to interfere is established, the de-
18. 36 Cal. 3d at 763-64, 686 P.2d at 1162-63, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359. Since the Statute
of Frauds was satisfied, the contract was enforceable. The court affirmed the judg-
ment for Seaman's for breach of contract.
19. Id. at 765-67, 686 P.2d at 1164-65, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
20. 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941). The case involved an action to restrain de-
fendants from inducing the breach of a contract not to compete. The court was asked
to decide under what circumstances an action may be had against a defendant who has
induced a third party to violate his contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 35, 112 P.2d at
632.
21. Id. at 37, 112 P.2d at 633 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 comment e
(1939)).
22. 36 Cal. 3d at 765, 686 P.2d at 1164, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The tort has been
expanded to include situations where the defendant makes plaintiff's performance
"more expensive or burdensome," Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 224, 232, 359 P.2d 465, 469, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1961), or interferes with the
formation of a future economic relationship, Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827,
537 P.2d 865, 870, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1975). This has not had the effect, however,
of removing the requirement that the defendant act with culpable intent. 36 Cal. 3d at
766-67, 686 P.2d at 1164, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
23. 36 Cal. 3d at 766-67, 686 P.2d at 1164-65, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
24. Id. at 766-67, 686 P.2d at 1165, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (citing Buckaloo v. Johnson,
14 Cal. 3d at 827, 537 P.2d at 871-72, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52) (emphasis omitted).
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fendant, as an affirmative defense, may plead justification for his ac-
tions.25 Thus, Seaman's was mistaken that intent was not a
prerequisite to liability and Standard was mistaken in believing that
motive was part of plaintiff's cause rather than an element of defend-
ant's defense. In Seaman's, the jury had been given an instruction
that the defendant would be deemed to have acted intentionally if it
could be shown that it was "substantially certain" that interference
with a contractual relationship would result from its actions.26 This
instruction was found erroneous, and the supreme court reversed the
judgment for intentional interference with contractual relations, with
directions to conduct further proceedings, as it seemed "obvious" to
the court that the inducement of the breach was merely an "inciden-
tal ... consequence of Standard's action."27
C. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The most notable of the issues presented to the court was
"whether, and under what circumstances, a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a commercial contract may
give rise to an action in tort."28 The court avoided the question alto-
gether by holding that it was unnecessary to predicate liability on a
breach of the covenant. Instead, a party to a contract may expose it-
self to tort liability when, in order to shield itself from liability for a
breach, it denies the existence of the contract in bad faith. 29
It is not at all clear why or how the court reached this conclusion.
In its opinion, the court recognized that the covenant of good faith
exists in every contract.3 0 In its history, the covenant has given rise
25. This is so because, as the court in Seaman's stated, "'[g]iven the intention to
interfere with the contract, liability usually will turn upon the ultimate purpose or ob-
ject which the defendant is seeking to advance.'" 36 Cal. 3d at 766, 686 P.2d at 1165,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971)).
26. 36 Cal. 3d at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. It is from this portion of the
court's opinion that Chief Justice Bird vigorously dissented, see infra note 53.
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
30. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (citing 1 B. WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 576 (8th ed. 1973)). Essentially, the covenant
requires that each party refrain from doing anything that will deprive the other from
the benefit of the agreement. Id. The California courts have recognized the existence
of the covenant. E.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141,
169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958). It should be noted that the cases cited herein are those cited by the court, and
to damages in contract for its breach,31 and in certain circumstances
the covenant has given rise to tort damages.32 The "special relation-
ship" involved in the latter cases was apparently a distinguishing fac-
tor between those cases and Seaman's.33 Seaman's argued that a
breach of the covenant should not be limited to those of insurance
contracts. The supreme court refused to take the bait, arguing that,
in effect, the type of "special relationship" which has given rise to
tort remedies for breach did not exist in this case.34 The parties, the
court reasoned, were free to agree "upon the standards by which ap-
plication of the covenant is to be measured." 35 The court did not
wish to open a new uncertain area where it might be difficult to dis-
tinguish between a breach of the covenant and a simple breach of the
contract. To do so might intrude upon the normal expectations of
parties to commercial contracts.36
Rather than involve itself in such a speculation, the court held that
tort remedies may be available when a breaching party tries, in bad
faith, to avoid liability for such breach by denying the existence of
the contract. 37 The court cited as persuasive authority the Oregon
Supreme Court case of Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, Inc.,38 where
the court held that punitive, or tort, damages might arise out of the
wrongful threat to sue by a defendant with knowledge that he had no
rightful claim.39 The defendant in such a case would be a "wrong-
that they involve the insured-insurer relationship. This may have proven important to
the court, as it found that such relationships involve a "special relationship" between
the parties. 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (citing Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696).
31. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949); Osbourne v. Cal-
Am Financial Corp., 80 Cal. App. 3d 259, 145 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1978); Foley v. U.S. Paving
Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 68 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968).
32. The seminal cases are Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), and Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328
P.2d 198 (1958). In Comunale, the defendant insurance company failed to defend its
insured against a claim by the plaintiff for injuries. Additionally, the insurer refused
to settle the case. The court, after recognizing that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing existed in the contract, noted that it is generally held that, since the
insurer controls the litigation it is guilty of bad faith in refusing a settlement.
Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 201. Such wrongful refusal to settle is gener-
ally treated as a tort, and where the case sounds in both contract and tort, the plaintiff
may elect between the actions. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203. Tort liability was expressly
recognized in Crisci. "Liability is imposed . . . for failure to meet the duty to accept
reasonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
33. 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
34. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. "For the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to decide the broad ques-
tion which Seaman's poses. Indeed, it is not even necessary to predicate liability on a
breach of the implied covenant." Id.
38. 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976).
39. Id. at 794, 556 P.2d at 681.
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doer in a tortious sense." 40 There would be ample reason to apply
tort damages in such a case.41
The California Supreme Court apparently felt that if Standard had
denied the existence of the contract in bad faith to avoid liability,
then Standard would be a "wrongdoer in a tortious sense" and sub-
ject to tort damages. The court saw little difference between a party
who threatened suit without probable cause and knowledge of no
rightful claim and a party who "adopts a 'stonewall' position"42 for no
reason, other than to avoid liability. In such a case, the availability of
tort remedies would not intrude upon the bargaining relationship or
expectations of the parties.43
In Seaman's, a jury instruction had been given which stated that
the law implies a covenant that parties will not deny the existence of
a contract since such denial violates the legal prohibition against
preventing the other party's realization of benefits of the contract.44
While it is not a tort to deny existence of a contract if done in good
faith,45 the court found that the jury instruction could lead a juror to
find Standard liable for such action. It was, therefore, erroneous.
The question remained whether the erroneous instruction required
reversal of the judgment against Standard.
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution46 states that er-
ror in instructing the jury will be grounds for reversal only after an
examination of the entire cause of action leads to the conclusion that
the jury instruction resulted in a "miscarriage of justice."4 7 The
phrase "miscarriage of justice" has been defined in terms of the fol-
lowing test: A miscarriage of justice should only be found where, af-
40. Id. In Adams, the defendant threatened suit with full knowledge that he had
no rightful claim. The jury apparently found that the threat was "'without probable
cause and with no belief in the existence of the cause of action.'" Id. The Oregon
Supreme Court considered this to be tortious conduct. Id
41. "[T]he same reasons for allowing punitive damages in actions [for damages] for
tortious conduct should apply when the action is to recover payment made as a result
of essentially tortious conduct." Id.
42. Standard refused to discuss the matter of the contract, telling Seaman's it
would "see you in court." 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
43. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
44. Id.
45. Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625
(1978). "[it is not a tort for a contractual obligor to dispute his liability under the con-
tract. Rather, the tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
consists in bad faith action ... with the motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's
enjoyment of contract rights." Id.
46. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
47. Id.
ter examining the entire cause of action, the reviewing court is of the
opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached without the error.48
This test is based upon reasonable probabilities rather than mere
ppssibilities. 49
The supreme court chose to utilize the approach of LeMons v. Re-
gents of University of California5O in determining the prejudicial ef-
fect of the jury instruction. A consideration of the five factors
considered in LeMons 5 ' led the court to the opinion that the errone-
ous jury instruction was reversible error, requiring reversal and re-
mand for further proceedings.52
Thus, the majority opinion stated the view that a breach of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing will not automatically give rise to
an action in tort, but rather that tort liability may be imposed in the
rather limited circumstance where a party, in bad faith, denies the
existence of a contract to avoid liability. The holding failed to extend
tort liability from a breach of the covenant in special relationship
contracts to a breach of the covenant in a commercial context. It was
from this holding that Chief Justice Bird vigorously dissented.5 3
IV. CONCLUSION
In relying on the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Adams v.
48. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956).
49. I. at 837, 299 P.2d at 255.
50. 21 Cal. 3d 869, 582 P.2d 946, 148 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1978).
51. Id. at 876, 582 P.2d at 950, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The five factors are as follows:
(1) the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues; (2) whether respon-
dent's argument to the jury may have contributed to the instruction's mislead-
ing effect; (3) whether the jury requested a rereading of the erroneous
instruction or the related evidence; (4) the closeness of the jury's verdict; (5)
effect of other instructions in remedying the error.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. 36 Cal. 3d at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
53. The Chief Justice was concerned that, although the majority recognized a bad
faith denial as a tort, the court failed to do so based on past decisions. Further, the
majority refused to recognize that, under certain circumstances, a breach of contract
may support a tort action for breach of the implied contract. The Chief Justice was of
the opinion that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed in all contracts and
that a tort remedy for its breach could be had in certain contexts not limited to insur-
ance contracts. In determining what conduct a court will find a tortious breach, the
courts must focus on the justifiable expectations of the parties. So, while the extent of
the implied covenant will vary, the underlying duty it represents exists in all con-
tracts. Chief Justice Bird was of the opinion that cases recognizing a tort remedy
based on a breach of the implied covenant did so based on that duty. One basic expec-
tation, the Chief Justice felt, was that a breaching party will compensate for its breach.
By denying, in bad faith, the existence of the contract, the breaching party is acting to
deny compensation for its breach, frustrating the justifiable expectations of the non-
breaching party. Such conduct is tortious and liability should be imposed based upon a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 36 Cal. 3d at 784, 686
P.2d at 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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Crater Well Drilling, Inc.5 4 for the proposition that bad faith denial
of the existence of the contract may give rise to tort liability, the ma-
jority avoided expanding the tort of breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to the commercial setting. In doing so, it
arguably failed to acknowledge its own precedent which gave tort
remedy for a breach of the implied covenant in certain circum-
stances. The court's refusal to expand the tort, and its willingness to
create a new limited one, perhaps indicates that the court no longer
wishes to expand the concept of the implied covenant past limited
circumstances which involve a special relationship, where the parties
do not deal at arm's length. Until another case involving an arm's
length transaction in a non-commercial setting comes along, the
court's intentions as to the covenant remain undetermined.
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Court gives retroactive effect to the holding in Carlos v.
Superior Court which requires a finding of intent to
kill or aid in a killing to justify a felony-murder
special circumstance: People v. Garcia.
People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1229 (1985), forced the supreme court
to confront questions previously unanswered in Carlos v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983). Carlos
held that a felony-murder special circumstance could only be found if
the prosecution proved the defendant's intent to kill or aid in a kill-
ing. In Garcia, the court determined (1) that Carlos should be ap-
plied retroactively, and (2) that failure to instruct a jury on intent
constitutes a prejudicial denial of due process requiring reversal.
The court determined that Carlos should be applied retroactively
after concluding that the threshold test of Donaldson v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 672 P.2d 110, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1983) (whether
the decision establishes a new rule of law), and the tripartite test of
Stovall v. Dennis, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (whether the decision is essen-
tial in the fact finding process), were met. The Carlos decision re-
quired retroactive application, in part, because it was required to
vindicate the meaning of a new statute, specifically, a portion of the
1978 death penalty initiative, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West
Supp. 1984).
54. 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976).
Garcia was convicted of attempted robbery and first degree murder
with a felony-murder special circumstance. His accomplice actually
committed the intended act and killed the victim; Garcia drove the
car and supplied the gun. The jury was not instructed on the issue of
intent to kill.
Based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the court
held that the failure to instruct on the intent element was a denial of
due process. By failing to so instruct the jury, the defendant was de-
nied the right to have a determination made of each element of the
charged crime. The jury was able to find the felony-murder special
circumstance merely by concluding that the defendant attempted a
robbery and that a killing occurred. The error was prejudicial and
required reversal for a determination of intent so the special circum-
stance issue could be decided.
B. Reasonable mistake as to victim's age not a defense to a
charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child
under fourteen years of age: People v. Olsen.
In People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 685 P.2d 52, 205 Cal. Rptr. 492
(1984), the court was asked to decide if a reasonable mistake as to the
age of a victim child could be a defense to a charge of lewd and las-
civious conduct with a child under fourteen years of age brought
under California Penal Code section 288(a). The court rejected the
idea of applying the mistake of age defense as enunciated by the
court in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1964). There, the court had reasoned that one lacks the
requisite criminal intent required to support a charge of statutory
rape when one commits the act with the good faith reasonable belief
that the victim is over eighteen years of age. In refusing to extend
Hernandez to the facts in this case, the court noted that policy con-
siderations demanded that the crimes of lewd and lascivious conduct
with a child under fourteen years of age and statutory rape be ac-
corded different treatment in their defenses. The court was guided
in this decision by three decisions from the courts of appeal dealing
with the mistake of age defense in the section 288 context.
In People v. Tober, 241 Cal. App. 2d 66, 50 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), the
court had found untenable the idea that one could reasonably be mis-
taken as to the age of one of such "tender years." In People v. Toli-
ver, 270 Cal. App. 2d 492, 75 Cal. Rptr. 819, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895
(1969), the court had reasoned that a different philosophy existed in
applying the defense to statutory rape than to section 288. Statutory
rape may involve consent, while lewd and lascivious conduct with a
child does not involve consent at all. It was also noted that section
288 provided a harsher penalty than that for statutory rape, signify-
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ing a concern with the protection of naive young children. In People
v. Gutierrez, 80 Cal. App. 3d 829, 145 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1979), the court
relied on Tober and Toliver in rejecting the defense in a section 288
case.
The supreme court drew on these cases to illustrate the concern
with the need for special protection of young children. The court
found additional evidence to support its holding in other legislative
provisions. California Penal Code section 1203.066 allows an individ-
ual convicted under section 288 to be placed on probation if he has a
good faith belief that the victim is over fourteen years old. By adopt-
ing this section, the legislature indicated that a mistake concerning
age was not a defense to the crime, but merely a mitigating factor in
sentencing.
Thus, the defendant's mistaken belief as to the victim's age was not
a defense and his conviction was affirmed.
C. Jury must be instructed to find an intent to kill in
'felony-murder" special circumstance case: Briggs
Instruction violates California Constitution: People v.
Ramos.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Ramos,' the supreme court considered two issues:
first, whether the failure to instruct the jury that an intentional kill-
ing is a required element of the "felony-murder" special circum-
stance set forth in section 190.2(a)(17) of the California Penal Code
constitutes reversible error;2 and second, whether section 190.3 of the
California Penal Code3-the so-called Briggs Instruction-violates
1. 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Bird, C.J., Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate con-
curring and dissenting opinion by Lucas, J.
2. Section 190.2(a)(17)(i) of the California Penal Code states:
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without tlae
possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special
circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be
true:
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or
was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or the im-
mediate flight after committing or attempting to commit the following felo-
nies:
(i) robbery in violation of section 211.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
3. Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code states in pertinent part:
the due process clause of the California Constitution.4 Both inquiries
were answered in the affirmative by the court.
II. BACKGROUND
The defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery and first degree
murder with a finding of the special circumstance of felony-murder,5
and after a penalty trial, the jury sentenced the defendant to death.6
During the guilt/special circumstances phase of the trial, the de-
fendant's counsel requested a ruling from the trial court that an in-
tentional killing was a required element of the "felony-murder"
special circumstance provision with which the defendant was
charged.7 The trial court rejected this request and ruled that the spe-
cial circumstance could be established under the felony-murder doc-
trine, in which an intent to kill is not required.8
At the penalty phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury, pur-
suant to the Briggs Instruction, that a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole could be modified or commuted by the
Governor.9
On a previous appeal,o the California Supreme Court concluded
that no reversible error occurred when the trial court refused the re-
quest to instruct the jury that an intent to kill was a required ele-
ment of a felony-murder special circumstance." However, it did
conclude that the Briggs Instruction violated the United States Con-
stitution and remanded the case.12
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the Briggs Instruction did not violate the federal Constitution and re-
manded the matter to the supreme court to consider other un-
If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree, and a
special circumstance has been charged and found to be true ... the trier of
fact shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or confinement in
state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confinement to state
prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole may in [the] future
after sentence is imposed, be commuted or modified to a sentence that in-
cludes the possibility of parole by the Governor of the State of California.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1985).
4. Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution states in pertinent part: "A
person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
.... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
5. 37 Cal. 3d at 144, 689 P.2d at 433, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
6. Id. at 145, 689 P.2d at 434, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
7. Id. at 144, 689 P.2d at 433, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 150, 689 P.2d at 438, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
10. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982).
11. Id. at 583, 639 P.2d at 924-25, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83.
12. Id. at 591-92, 639 P.2d at 930, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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resolved issues.13
In an intervening decision from the California Supreme Court,
Carlos v. Superior Court,14 the court determined that an intentional
killing is a required element of the "felony-murder" special circum-
stance set forth in section 190.2(a)(17). 15
III. ANALYSIS
A. An Intentional Killing is a Required Element of the "Felony-
Murder" Special Circumstance
The defendant contended that the Carlos decision,16 which held
that an intentional killing is a required element of the "felony-mur-
der" special circumstance set forth in section 190.2(a)(17), required a
reversal of the special finding and penalty judgment.17
The Attorney General set forth two arguments opposing a reversal,
however, the court was not persuaded. First, he contended that the
court need not reach the substantive merits of the defendant's claim
as the law of the case doctrine prevailed.iB Because the California
Supreme Court in its first review of this case19 "reversed only the
penalty judgment and affirmed the judgment in all other respects
... that decision.., upheld the special circumstance finding which
defendant may not reopen."2o However, the court held that the de-
fendant's situation met the exception to the law of the case doctrine
inasmuch as the doctrine does not apply where "the controlling rules
of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening be-
tween the first and second determinations." 21 The intervening Carlos
decision was just such a clarification.22
Second, on the merits, the Attorney General argued that a reversal
was not required "(1) because Carlos' interpretation of the special cir-
cumstance provision should not be applied to cases tried before the
13. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3460 (1983).
14. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
15. Id. at 142, 672 P.2d at 869, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
17. 37 Cal. 3d at 145, 689 P.2d at 434, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
18. See generally People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 840-48, 533 P.2d 211, 215-20, 120
Cal. Rptr. 83, 87-92 (1975).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
20. 37 Cal. 3d at 146, 689 P.2d at 434, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
21. See DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178-80, 367 P.2d 865, 871-72,
18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-76 (1962).
22. 37 Cal. 3d at 146, 689 P.2d at 434, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
Carlos decision, or (2) because the error was not prejudicial." 23
The court held Carlos to be applicable as its holding applied "retro-
actively to all cases not yet final."2 4 With regard to prejudicial error,
the court determined that absent four narrow exceptions it would
have to find reversible error in failing to instruct the jury of the in-
tent to kill element in a special circumstances case. People v. Gar-
cia2 5 set forth the only instances in which a failure to give a proper
intent instruction under Carlos does not require a reversal of a spe-
cial circumstance finding. They are: (1) "'if the erroneous instruc-
tion was given in connection with an offense for which the defendant
was acquitted and if the instruction had no bearing on the offense for
which he was convicted,' "26 (2) "'if the defendant conceded the issue
of intent,' "27 (3) if "'the factual question posed by the omitted in-
struction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under
other, properly given instructions,' "28 or (4) under limited circum-
stances, if "the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a
matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of
consideration.' '29
In this case, the Garcia exceptions were not applicable. The first
three exceptions clearly were inapplicable without further explana-
tion.3 0 The fourth exception was also not applicable since the testi-
mony by the defendant that he did not intend to kill the victims but
only intended to graze them so as to mislead his accomplice into be-
lieving they had been killed, could not be dismissed as "not worthy of
consideration. "31
Finally, although the prosecutor, in his closing argument, told the
jury that if they did not feel the murder was an execution murder
they should not return the death penalty, the jury was not bound to
23. Id.
24. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 547-50, 684 P.2d 826, 829-31, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265,
269-70 (1984).
25. Id
26. Id at 554, 684 P.2d at 833-34, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (quoting Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87 (1983)).
27. Id
28. Id, at 554-55, 684 P.2d at 834-35, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74 (quoting People v.
Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 721, 518 P.2d 913, 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1974)).
29. Id. at 556, 684 P.2d at 835-36, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75 (footnote omitted) (rely-
ing on standard drawn from People v. Thorton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1974), and People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792,
(1973)).
With regard to this last exception, the Garcia case added the caveat that this excep-
tion shall apply "only to those cases clearly falling within the ambit of that reasoning"
as it is not clear that this exception will be approved by the United States Supreme
Court. 36 Cal. 3d at 556, 684 P.2d at 836, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 275 (emphasis added).
30. 37 Cal. 3d at 147, 689 P.2d at 435-36, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
31. Id, at 148, 689 P.2d at 436, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
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accept this suggestion. 32 The fact that the jury returned the death
penalty did not automatically indicate the jury found intent.33 More-
over, there was nothing in the remark which told the jury it had to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill
before it could return a death penalty.34 The jury could have be-
lieved it was required to return a death sentence so long as it found
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors without re-
gard to whether the killing was intentional.3 5
In light of the above, the defendant was entitled to a reversal of
the special circumstance finding and penalty judgment.36 The case
was remanded for a new trial of the special circumstance phase
before a jury to be instructed that in order to find a felony-murder
special circumstance, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intended to kill the victim.3 7
B. The Constitutionality of the Briggs Instruction
Although the United States Supreme Court held that the Briggs
Instruction did not violate the federal Constitution,38 the Court made
it clear that the validity of the Briggs Instruction under the Califor-
nia Constitution was to be decided by the California Supreme
Court. 3
9
32. Id. at 149-50, 689 P.2d at 437, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id at 150, 689 P.2d at 437, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
37. Id.
38. In response to the claim that the instruction's focus on the Governor's commu-
tation power conflicted with the eighth amendment requirement that the decision
whether a defendant shall live or die be based upon a "consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and circumstances of the particular offense." Ra-
mos, 30 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 639 P.2d at 932-33, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that the Briggs Instruction invited the jury to consider the
" 'future dangerousness' of the defendant rather than the actions of some future Gov-
ernor," California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3453-54. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976).
With regard to the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the omission of the
fact that the death penalty, as well as life without possibility of parole, is subject to
gubernatorial commutation violates federal constitutional standards, the Supreme
Court held that advising the jury that a death sentence may also be commuted would
not necessarily benefit a defendant because then the jurors-informed that their deci-
sion was not final-might "approach their sentencing decision with less appreciation
for the gravity of their choice and for the moral responsibility reposed in them as
sentencers." Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3458.
39. 103 S. Ct. at 3451 n.7.
Upon a review of prior California decisions and related precedents
in other states, the court concluded that the Briggs Instruction was
incompatible with the fundamental fairness guarantee of article I,
section 740 and article I, section 1541 of the California Constitution be-
cause it was misleading and prompted jury speculation.
1. Misleading character of the Briggs Instruction
Under article V, section 8 of the California Constitution, the Gov-
ernor's power of commutation or pardon extends equally to a sen-
tence of life without possibility of parole and a sentence of death.42
In view of article V, section 8, the court found the Briggs Instruction,
which informs the jury only that a sentence of life without possibility
of parole may be commuted, to be a "half truth."43
The court reasoned that
since the instruction is only given in a penalty trial-when the jury's attention
is narrowly focused on two alternative punishments-the instruction would be
reasonably understood by the average juror to mean. . . that while a sentence
of life without possibility of parole may be commuted, a sentence of death
may not.
4 4
Because of its tendency to mislead, the Briggs Instruction denied the
defendant due process.45
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. Article I, section 15, clause 7 states: "[The defendant in a criminal case shall
not] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 15, cl. 7.
42. Article V, section 8, provides in full:
Subject to application procedures provided by statute, the Governor, on condi-
tions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commu-
tation, after sentence, except in the case of impeachment. The Governor shall
report to the Legislature each reprieve, pardon, and commutation granted,
stating the pertinent facts and the reasons for granting it. The Governor may
not grant a pardon or commutation to a person twice convicted of a felony ex-
cept on recommendation of the Supreme Court, 4 judges concurring.
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
43. 37 Cal. 3d at 153, 689 P.2d at 440, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
44. Id. at 153-54, 689 P.2d at 440, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
45. Id. at 155, 689 P.2d at 440, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The Attorney General
presented a number of theories in opposition to this conclusion. First, he suggested
that a jury that is concerned about a defendant's possible release through the Gover-
nor's power of commutation would not be any less inclined to vote for the death pen-
alty if it were informed that even a death sentence would not necessarily prevent such
release. Id.
Second, the Attorney General asserted the "half-truth" of the Briggs Instruction
may be justified on the grounds that the "other half of the truth-informing the jury
that a death sentence can also be commuted-would inject additional prejudice." Id. at
154, 689 P.2d at 441, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The jury might be less hesitant to impose
the death penalty if it realized the Governor had the power to commute a death sen-
tence because he believed the jury made a mistake in sentencing. Id.
Third, the Attorney General argued the incomplete nature of the Briggs Instruction
was not likely to be prejudicial because jurors can be expected to know, as a matter of
common knowledge, that a death sentence, as well as a sentence of life without the
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2. Speculative nature of the Briggs Instruction
Hypothesizing that if the Briggs Instruction was modified so that it
was completely accurate, the court concluded that the instruction
would still violate the state constitution's due process guarantee be-
cause the Instruction's reference to the commutation power invited
the jury to speculate on matters not within the jury's province. 46
The most obvious problem was that the instruction invited the jury
to speculate on what a particular defendant would be like in the fu-
ture when commutation may be considered, i.e., what a Governor
would do in response to the defendant's condition.47
Furthermore, the instruction diverted the jury from its proper
function. First, it may tend to diminish the jury's personal sense of
responsibility for its action. 48 Second, "an instruction on the possibil-
ity of commutation invites the jury to go beyond its proper role and
attempt to 'preempt' the Governor's constitutional authority by im-
posing a sentence that will at least minimize the opportunity for such
a commutation."49
Thus, upon this analysis, it was clear to the court that the Briggs
possibility of parole, may be commuted by the Governor. Id. at 155, 689 P.2d at 441, 207
Cal. Rptr. at 811.
46. Id. See also People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 636-53, 388 P.2d 33, 36-47, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 204-15 (1964) (wherein the court held it was improper for the jury to con-
sider a variety of potential post-conviction actions by other government entities in de-
termining the sentence a defendant shall receive). The great majority of courts to
consider the issue have "concluded that the jury should not consider the possibility of
pardon, parole, or commutation." 37 Cal. 3d at 156 n.10, 689 P.2d at 442 n.10, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 812 n.10 (listing decisions from twenty-five jurisdictions). But see State v.
Jackson, 100 Ariz. 91, 412 P.2d 36 (1966); Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d 889 (Ind. 1981);
and Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532, 175 N.E. 219 (1930), wherein courts have held to
the contrary.
47. 37 Cal. 3d at 156, 689 P.2d at 442, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 812. See also People v. Mur-
tishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 767-75, 631 P.2d 446, 466-71, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 758-63 (1981)
(general expert testimony of a defendant's alleged future dangerousness is not suffi-
ciently reliable to be considered at the penalty phase of a capital trial); State v. Linsey,
404 So. 2d 466, 487 (La. 1981) (death sentences imposed by jury speculation renders the
decision arbitrary); Farris v. State, 535 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Tenn. 1976) (jury speculation
constitutes trial "by guess and by golly").
48. 37 Cal. 3d at 157, 689 P.2d at 443, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See also People v. Lin-
den, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 27, 338 P.2d 397, 410 (1959) (prosecutor should not advise jury of auto-
matic appeal when death penalty is imposed because such advice tends to diminish
seriousness of the jury's function); Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20, 25 (Del. 1974) ("knowl-
edge on the part of a jury that there is possible review by other governmental authori-
ties may cause that jury to avoid its responsibility...").
49. 37 Cal. 3d at 158, 689 P.2d at 443, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See also Linsey, 404 So.
2d at 487; State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 177-79, 142 A.2d 65, 76 (1958) (jury could conclude
governor will improperly pardon an offender, thereby encouraging it to preempt the
governor's power by opting for the death penalty).
Instruction in reality serves no legitimate purpose. By directing the
jury's attention to the Governor's commutation power, the instruc-
tion invites the jury to second-guess a future Governor's exercise of
his commutation powers. The jury might impose a harsher sentence
out of a fear that the Governor might be too lenient and release the
defendant while he is still a danger to society.50 These factors were
deemed not within the province of the jury and therefore inconsis-
tent with the defendant's rights under the California Constitution.5 1
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the California Supreme Court
reversed the judgment insofar as it related to the felony-murder spe-
cial circumstance. The defendant was entitled to have the case re-
manded for a new trial of the special circumstance phase before a
jury that was properly instructed. The court also held that the law of
the case doctrine did not preclude the defendant from raising this
claim.
Finally, the court held that the Briggs Instruction violated the due
process clause of the California Constitution as it was misleading and
invited the jury to consider speculative and impermissible factors in
reaching its decision.
VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Erroneous jury instruction may not serve as basis for
reversal when defense counsel knowingly acquiesces in
the giving of the incorrect instruction as a tactical
decision: People v. Avalos.
In People v. Avalos, 37 Cal. 3d 216, 689 P.2d 121, 207 Cal. Rptr. 549
(1984), the supreme court was asked to determine whether the trial
court erred in giving an instruction that the jury could return a ver-
dict of murder without specifying the degree and then in deeming the
subsequent conviction to be second degree murder. While the court
held the instruction to be erroneous, it also held that defense counsel
could not ask for a reversal on appeal as he acquiesced in the jury
instruction as a tactical decision.
The defendant was found guilty of two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon, and the jury found true the allegations he personally
used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. The jury also re-
turned a verdict of murder without specifying a degree. The jury de-
liberated for a full day and then requested instruction on the intent
element of first degree murder. In addition, the jury inquired to de-
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 158, 689 P.2d at 443, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
51. Id. at 158, 689 P.2d at 443-44, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14.
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termine the validity of a verdict that held the defendant guilty of
murder but failed to specify a degree. The court instructed the jury
it might return a verdict on those points on which it unanimously
agreed and as to portions it could not agree upon, the jurors were to
indicate on the jury form their lack of unanimity. Neither counsel
commented on this instruction, although the prosecutor requested
that the record reflect that authority for such an instruction was Cal-
ifornia Penal Code section 1157. The court then offered the addi-
tional citation of Stalcup v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 3d 932, 101
Cal. Rptr. 467 (1972).
As the Avalos court noted, however, Stalcup had been expressly
disapproved by the supreme court in People v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 3d 43,
592 P.2d 752, 154 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1979). The Dixon court indicated
that Penal Code section 1157 was not intended to apply in situations
where the jury was deadlocked on the question of degree. The trial
court erred, therefore, in assuming that it could simply decree that
the defendant was guilty of second degree murder (the lesser degree)
if the jury returned a degreeless guilty verdict. Its instruction, based
on Stalcup, was in error.
The record showed, however, that defense counsel knew of the er-
ror yet acquiesced in the hope his client would receive the lesser de-
gree. His purpose was to avoid a mistrial with the resulting exposure
of his client to a new trial and possible first degree murder verdict.
"This deliberate tactical motive for encouraging the trial court to pro-
ceed with an erroneous instruction precludes defendant from assert-
ing this error as a basis for reversal of his conviction." See People v.
McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984)
(treats application of section 1157 when jury fails to set degree due to
mistake by trial court rather than as a result of deadlock) (McDonald
is discussed in this survey at 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 851 (1985)).
B. Warrant issued was without probable cause and an
arrest made pursuant to the warrant was illegal where
affidavit in support of the application was based on an
untested informant's hearsay evidence: People v.
Campa.
The supreme court in People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d 870, 686 P.2d 634,
206 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1984), was asked to decide whether the trial court
was correct in suppressing statements made by the defendant on the
grounds that the arrest of the defendant was without probable cause.
The warrant which police used to arrest the defendant in his home
was based on hearsay evidence provided by an informant who was
untested as to credibility. The supreme court held that the trial
court was correct to suppress the defendant's statements, relying on
established California precedent dealing with hearsay evidence from
informants.
Defendant Campa was arrested in his home and charged with mur-
der and attempted murder pursuant to a warrant based on hearsay
evidence obtained by police from another person charged in connec-
tion with the crime. At the station house, the defendant admitted
having committed the crimes of which he had been charged. Since
these statements were the state's principal evidence, the trial court's
suppression of the statements left the state without enough evidence
to sustain a conviction. The trial court, on its own motion, dismissed
the charges and the state appealed.
The supreme court based its decision, among other things, on pre-
cedent established in People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176, 454 P.2d 681,
77 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1969). In Hamilton, the court held that when an
affidavit in support, of an application for a warrant is based on hear-
say evidence the affidavit must contain underlying factual informa-
tion from which the magistrate could reasonably conclude the
informant was credible or his information reliable. The court in
Campa found the affidavit to contain no factual background suffi-
cient to allow a magistrate to draw the conclusion that the inform-
ant's information was reliable.
The informant's testimony against his own interests was not
enough to prove reliability since he had been arrested and was possi-
bly subject to police pressure, or hoped to bargain with the informa-
tion. The affidavit needed to show underlying factual information
supporting the informant's reliability. As it failed to do so, the war-
rant issued was without probable cause, and Campa's arrest based on
that warrant was illegal. Any statements made by him subsequent to
the illegal arrest were therefore properly suppressed by the trial
court.
The defendant's additional claim that his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965), were violated was disallowed by the
court, as the Penal Code section under which the defendant had
made his motion to suppress dealt only with search and seizure is-
sues. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1358.5 (West Supp. 1984).
C. Failure to use reasonable diligence in obtaining
testimony not sufficient basis for denial of defendant's
motion for retrial; such testimony may have affected
outcome of trial: People v. Martinez.
In People v. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d 816, 685 P.2d 1203, 205 Cal. Rptr.
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852 (1984), the court looked at whether the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying a motion for new trial when the defendant at-
tempted to bring a new witness. In holding the denial an abuse of
discretion, the court found that the testimony might well have
changed the outcome, and that the defendant's counsel's lack of rea-
sonable diligence in obtaining such testimony was not a sufficient ba-
sis for denial of the motion.
The defendant Martinez was convicted of second degree burglary.
The prosecution's case essentially rested on the discovery of the de-
fendant's handprint on a stolen drill press and the testimony of a
maintenance person of the company from which the press was stolen
that he had painted the drill press the afternoon before the burglary.
The defendant had testified that he was at home with friends the en-
tire evening of the burglary. Following the jury's finding of guilt, the
defendant moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
A former foreman of the company from which the press was stolen
was prepared to testify that the drill press had not in fact been
painted the day of the burglary. The defendant, a former employee
and frequent visitor of the company, had had ample opportunity to
leave his handprint on the drill press prior to the burglary. The trial
court denied the motion on the grounds the defendant did not use
due diligence in locating the foreman and that the court was not con-
vinced the foreman's testimony would have changed the outcome in
any event.
The bases the trial court used in denying the motion for a new trial
came from the 1887 case of People v. Sutton, 73 Cal. 243, 15 P. 86
(1887). The supreme court, in deciding whether the trial court had
abused its discretion therefore examined the two bases used by the
trial court based on the facts of the case.
The first basis discussed was that the newly discovered evidence
was considered by the trial court to not affect the outcome of the
trial. As the supreme court observed, this reasoning was simply not
plausible. The prosecution's entire case rested on the palm print
found on the drill press. Since the company maintenance man testi-
fied that he had painted the drill press the afternoon of the burglary
the print had to have been placed there the night of the theft. The
new witness turned up by the defense would have testified that in
fact the drill press was not painted the day of the burglary, and as
the defendant had ample opportunity to use the drill press in his
work for a neighboring company, the palm print could have been
placed on the press at a time other than the time of the burglary.
Such evidence would cast serious doubts in the jury's mind as to the
weight the prosecution placed on the palm print. It would, therefore,
have much opportunity to affect the outcome of the trial, and the
supreme court could not uphold a denial of the defendant's motion
on the theory the evidence would not affect the outcome.
The second basis was that the defense failed to use reasonable dili-
gence to discover the witness. Although the facts could reasonably
indicate the defense did fail to exercise reasonable diligence, the
court felt this alone would not be a sufficient basis for denial of a mo-
tion for new trial. Once it was found the new evidence could affect
the outcome, there was no reason to run the risk of wrongfully con-
victing an innocent person. To do so would punish the defendant for
the lack of diligence of his counsel, working a "manifest miscarriage
of justice."
D. An accused's invocation of rights bars all further
interrogations; corpus delicti of felony-based special
circumstance can not be established solely by
defendant's extrajudicial statements: People v. Mattson.
In People v. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 887, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278
(1984), the supreme court refused to erode the principle that once a
defendant has invoked his privilege against self-incrimination the po-
lice cannot question him again, even if the Miranda warnings are re-
peated and subsequently waived.
The defendant was in custody in Nevada on suspicion of kidnap-
ping, rape, and armed robbery of a young woman. When advised of
his Miranda rights, the defendant replied that he did not wish to
speak and requested an attorney. Although the defendant had been
appointed an attorney, during the next six weeks he was in custody,
various police officers from both Nevada and California questioned
the defendant about various other felony sex crimes. Each time the
defendant waived his Miranda rights and implicated himself. He was
subsequently convicted on two first degree murders and received the
death penalty.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that because he invoked his con-
stitutional rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel
when he was initially advised of his Miranda rights, his subsequent
confessions were inadmissible.
Since California state officials were involved in the interrogations,
the supreme court held California law was applicable. In addition to
the fact that the police officials knew the defendant had been ap-
pointed a public defender, under the rule enunciated in People v. Pet-
tingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978), neither
the delay between the initial assertion of the privilege to remain si-
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lent nor the fact that the renewed questioning concerned different
crimes in another jurisdiction absolved the state from violating the
defendant's rights subsequent to an initial assertion of his Miranda
rights.
Inasmuch as it was prejudicial error to admit the ensuing confes-
sions, the judgment of conviction was reversed. The court addressed
another issue to guide the trial court on retrial. The court concluded
that "the corpus delicti of felony-based special circumstances must be
established independently of an accused's extrajudicial statements."
E. Defendant whose sentence is enhanced by prior
conviction may collaterally attack the constitutional
validity of that conviction by means of a motion to
strike on the ground that the defendant was unaware
of his constitutional rights: People v. Sumstine.
In People v. Sumstine,' the supreme court was asked to decide
whether a defendant could utilize a motion to strike to collaterally
attack a prior conviction. The motion was based on the grounds that
the court in the prior proceeding had accepted a guilty plea without
first determining if the defendant was aware of the rights being
waived by the guilty plea and if his waiver was a knowing one.2 In
holding in the affirmative, the court delineated the procedure for col-
laterally attacking a prior conviction.
I. FACTUAL SITUATION
In February of 1982, the defendant was charged in Los Angeles
County with nine counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on
1. 36 Cal. 3d 909, 687 P.2d 904, 206 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
with Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and
dissenting opinion by Lucas, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird, C.J.
2. Id. at 914-15, 687 P.2d at 907, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The defendant cited Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970). In Boykin, the United States
Supreme Court held that a court may not accept a guilty plea from a defendant until it
determines the defendant was aware of the rights waived by the plea and the waiver
was a knowing and voluntary one. Such a determination had to be made even if the
defendant was represented by counsel. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 240-44. In Tahl, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court interpreted the Boykin Court's refusal to presume a knowing
waiver from a record silent on the point to mean that the record must show on its face
that the defendant knew his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. In re
Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d at 130, 460 P.2d at 455, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
the body of a child under age 14.3 The information alleged a prior
conviction in Kern County for the same offense. Initially, the de-
fendant pled innocent to all nine counts, but subsequently entered a
plea of guilty to three. He allowed the trial court to read the tran-
script of the preliminary hearing to provide a factual basis for the
charges. Further, he admitted the facts of the prior conviction, re-
serving the right to challenge its constitutional validity.4 At the sen-
tencing hearing, he made a motion to strike the prior conviction.5
The trial court denied the motion to strike based on its reading of
People v. Reeves.6
In Reeves, the court of appeal held that the use of motions to strike
was limited to situations where the defendant clearly alleged that he
was not represented by counsel and had not waived the right to be
represented. 7 In the instant case, the defendant had been repre-
sented by counsel in the Kern County proceeding. Based on Reeves,
the trial court denied the motion to strike the prior. It then passed
sentence, enhanced by the three year additional term imposed by Pe-
nal Code section 667.58 The defendant appealed, contesting the denial
of the motion to strike and the additional three years of
incarceration.
II. OPINION OF THE COURT
A. Availability of Motion to Strike
The supreme court reasoned that the trial court's reliance on Peo-
ple v. Reeves had been erroneous. 9 Relying on People v. Coffey, 10 the
3. 36 Cal. 3d at 914, 687 P.2d at 907, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The charges were
brought under California Penal Code section 288.
4. 37 Cal. 3d at 914, 687 P.2d at 907, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
5. Id. The defendant's motion to strike the prior conviction was an attempt to
avoid the automatic enhancement of his sentence provided by section 667.5 of the Pe-
nal Code, which makes mandatory an additional and consecutive three years for each
prior conviction of certain violent felonies, including a section 288 offense. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667.5 (West Supp. 1985).
6. 123 Cal. App. 3d 65, 176 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1981).
7. Id. at 68, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The court in People v. Reeves found controlling
the decision of People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967).
The Coffey court, in discussing the kind of allegation necessary to challenge a prior
conviction stated, "the issue must be raised by means of allegations which, if true,
would render the prior conviction devoid of constitutional support." Id at 215, 430
P.2d at 23, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 465. The Coffey court went on to quote People v. Merriam,
66 Cal. 2d 390, 397, 426 P.2d 161, 166, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1967), for the proposition that a
defendant's challenge to a prior conviction may be. made "'only through a clear allega-
tion to the effect that, in the proceedings leading to the prior conviction under attack,
he neither was represented by counsel nor waived the right to be so represented.'" 67
Cal. 2d at 215, 430 P.2d at 23, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 465 (emphasis in original).
8. 36 Cal. 3d at 915, 687 P.2d at 907, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
9. Id. at 915, 687 P.2d at 907-08, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
10. 67 Cal. 2d 204, 215, 430 P.2d 15, 23, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 465 (1967).
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court of appeals in Reeves based its opinion on the notion that a de-
fendant could only challenge a prior conviction if he had not been
represented by counsel or had not waived the right to such counsel."
However, the Reeves court failed to read the Coffey decision prop-
erly.12 It had failed to take into account the Coffey court's ultimate
holding that a defendant could raise any challenge that undermined
a prior conviction's constitutionality.13 In Coffey, the supreme court
had reasoned that if the state, by statute, were to impose additional
sentences upon defendants because of prior convictions, the defend-
ant must be allowed every opportunity to challenge the constitutional
basis of those convictions.14 To impose additional sanctions based on
prior convictions, the state must assume the burden of meeting any
attacks on the constitutionality of such prior convictions.' 5 Although
the court in Coffey spoke only in terms of the lack of counsel, or lack
of waiver of the right to counsel, motions to strike prior convictions
are not limited by such language.16
At the time Coffey was decided, courts assumed that the presence
of counsel ensured that the defendant was well aware of his rights to
a jury trial, his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to
confront accusers.17 In the absence of counsel, the courts were re-
quired only to determine whether the defendant had been informed
of his right to counsel and had waived that right.' 8 The Reeves court
failed to recognize that in speaking of the right to counsel, the Coffey
court was impliedly also referring to the other constitutional rights
as well.' 9 By limiting the motion to strike prior convictions only to
11. People v. Reeves, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85. Relying on
Merriam, the Reeves court reasoned that "the court in Coffey apparently limited use of
the motion to strike to situations where a defendant clearly alleged that he neither
was represented by counsel nor waived his right to be so represented." Id at 68, 176
Cal. Rptr. at 184.
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 916, 687 P.2d at 908, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 711 ("Such a reading of Cof-
fey is unduly strained").
13. Id. at 917, 687 P.2d at 908-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
14. People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d at 214-15, 430 P.2d at 22, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 464. "(T]o
the extent that statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is
activated by the presence of prior convictions, it is imperative that the constitutional
basis of such convictions be examined if challenged by proper allegations." Id. (citing
In re Woods, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P.2d 913, 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966)).
15. 67 Cal. 2d at 214-15, 430 P.2d at 22, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
16. 36 Cal. 3d at 917, 687 P.2d at 909, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
17. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 128-29, 460 P.2d 449, 453-54, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581-82
(1969).
18. Id. at 129, 460 P.2d at 453-54, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
19. 36 Cal. 3d at 917, 687 P.2d at 909, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 712. "[T]he court was im-
pliedly seeking to protect the defendant's other constitutional rights (such as right to
situations where either counsel was not present or the defendant had
not waived counsel, the Reeves court set out a rule too limited in its
scope.20
Further, in Boykin v. Alabama,21 the United States Supreme Court
held that the mere presence of an attorney did not establish that a
defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.22 It is up to the
trial court to "make sure [the defendant] has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequence." 23 Under these cir-
cumstances, even if the Coffey court had intended to limit motions to
strike to instances involving right to counsel, that approach would no
longer be valid after Boykin.24 A court seeking to enhance a sen-
tence because of a prior conviction would have to look beyond
whether counsel had been present or a waiver had been made. It
would instead be required to determine whether the defendant had a
"full understanding" of the plea.25
The attorney for the state urged that Coffey, in light of Boykin,
should still be limited to right to counsel claims because of the pecu-
liar importance of the right to counsel.26 The court found this argu-
ment to be without weight,27 and held a motion to strike a prior
conviction based on a challenge to the constitutionality of the pro-
ceeding under Boykin and In re Tahl28 to be "equally permissible." 29
B. Timeliness of Motion
Having established that a motion to strike prior convictions could
be based on rights enunciated in Boykin and Tahl, the court was left
to determine the procedural limitations on such motions. Initially,
jury trial] indirectly by protecting his right to counsel." Id. at 918, 687 P.2d at 909, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 712.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. Consequently, the Reeves decision
was disapproved. Id. at 919 n.6, 687 P.2d at 910 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.6.
21. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
22. The defendant in Boykin was represented by counsel when he pled guilty to
charges of robbery. The trial record showed no instance where the judge asked the
defendant questions about his plea, and the defendant never addressed the court. Id.
at 239. From this, and the fact that the Boykin Court refused to presume a waiver
even though the defendant was represented at trial, it can be assumed that the pres-
ence of counsel was not determinative. Id. at 243.
23. Id. at 244. In Alabama at that time, a guilty plea to a charge of common law
robbery could result in the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 240.
24. 36 Cal. 3d at 918, 687 P.2d at 910, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 713. "If we could once have
assumed that by protecting a defendant's right to counsel we were preserving his other
rights, we could no longer have so assumed." Id.
25. Id. at 918, 687 P.2d at 909, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
26. Id. at 918, 687 P.2d at 910, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
27. "[R]espondent suggests no reason for distinguishing ...the right to counsel
from the rights protected in Boykin/Tahl. ... Id.
28. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911
(1970).
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 919, 687 P.2d at 910, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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the state contended that Sumstine's motion to strike was untimely.
The state relied primarily on People v. Lewis,30 which had affirmed a
denial of a motion to strike a four year old conviction because the de-
fendant "made no showing whatsoever that he had ever attempted to
attack or set aside the plea in a timely or appropriate manner, or that
he had an excuse for failing to do so."31 In the absence of such a
showing, the Lewis court reasoned that the defendant had waived
any possible challenge to the prior conviction, and the conviction
"could not be collaterally attacked." 32 The supreme court in Sum-
stine found, however, that the court of appeal in Lewis had erred in
its reliance on certain authority for its holding.33
The Lewis court relied on the supreme court's decision in In re
Ronald E., 34 where a juvenile sought release by way of writ of habeas
corpus. 35 While the state conceded that the initial jurisdictional
hearing failed to comply with Boykin-Tahl requirements, the
supreme court found that the juvenile was not entitled to raise such
issues in connection with the writ of habeas corpus.36 The challenge
was held to be untimely, and the defendant's failure to justify his
failure to make a prompt challenge caused the court to disallow the
writ.37 Based on this holding, the Lewis court reasoned that where a
motion to strike is made in an untimely manner, without justification
for the delay, then the motion should be denied.3 8
However, the Lewis court erred in failing to make a crucial distinc-
tion between the facts in In re Ronald E. and the facts in Lewis.39 In
In re Ronald E., the defendant sought release by writ of habeas
corpus. In Lewis, the defendant merely attempted to strike a prior
conviction which the court intended to use to enhance his sentence.40
Denial of the writ for untimeliness was consistent with habeas corpus
law.41 Writs of habeas corpus, however, bear little resemblance to
30. 74 Cal. App. 3d 633, 141 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1977).
31. Id. at 640, 141 Cal Rptr. at 617 (citing In re Ronald E., 19 Cal. 3d 315, 321-23,
562 P.2d 684, 692, 137 Cal. Rptr. 781, 785 (1977)).
32. Id.
33. 36 Cal. 3d at 919, 687 P.2d at 910, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
34. 19 Cal. 3d 315, 562 P.2d 684, 137 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977).
35. Id. at 319, 562 P.2d at 686, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
36. Id. at 321-22, 562 P.2d at 692, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
37. Id. at 322, 562 P.2d at 692, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
38. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
39. 36 Cal. 3d at 919, 687 P.2d at 910-11, 206 Cal Rptr. at 713.
40. Id. at 919, 687 P.2d at 911, 206 Cal Rptr. at 713-14.
41. In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 773, 518 P.2d 1129, 1134, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182
(1974).
motions to strike prior convictions.42 Thus, the court in Sumstine
held that if the Boykin/Tahl challenges were raised properly at or
prior to trial, the trial court must make a determination on the mer-
its. 43 Thus, the defendant's motion was timely.
C. Sufficiency of Motion
All that remained for the court was a determination of the suffi-
ciency of the motion. The defendant's motion was based on the si-
lence of the record a4 The defendant claimed that there was no
indication from the record that he had been informed of any of his
rights or knowingly waived them.45 Such a record would be a cause
for reversal of the conviction under Boykin and Tahl.46 The defend-
ant argued that the result should be no different on a motion to
strike. The court disagreed, holding that the standard established in
People v. Coffey would apply,47 and that a "defendant seeking to
challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial
of his constitutional rights."48
Under Coffey, when a defendant, by his motion to strike, has made
allegations of constitutional infirmity sufficient to justify a hearing,
the state bears the burden of proving the previous conviction.4 9 Fol-
lowing such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
that his Boykin/Tahl rights were violated in the preceeding convic-
The general rule is that "habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for ap-
peal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for
failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors
could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment
of conviction."
Id. (citations omitted).
42. "When the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus vacates the underlying judg-
ment of conviction, the judgment ceases to exist for all purposes .... On the other
hand, motions to strike do not vacate the underlying conviction. ... 36 Cal. 3d at
920, 687 P.2d at 911, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
43. Id. (citing People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d at 215, 430 P.2d at 23, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
465). Consequently, the Sumstine court disapproved of People v. Lewis. 36 Cal. 3d at
919 n.6, 687 P.2d at 910 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 713 n.6.
44. Id at 921, 687 P.2d at 912, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 715. The trial record presumably
had been destroyed after five years pursuant to Government Code section 69955(d).
45. 36 Cal. 3d at 922, 687 P.2d at 912-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16. Tahl required the
trial record to be specific and expressly enumerate the three constitutional rights
waived by a guilty plea. The record must clearly show that the defendant knew his
rights and voluntarily waived them by a guilty plea. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d at 132, 460
P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584. The purpose was to establish a clear record for an
appellate court to review. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. Further, an otherwise valid convic-
tion could not fall because of an incomplete record. Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d at 132, 460 P.2d at
456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
46. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. "[T]here was reversible error 'because the record does
not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of
guilty.' " Id.
47. 36 Cal. 3d at 922, 687 P.2d at 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
48. Id.
49. 67 Cal. 2d at 317, 430 P.2d at 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
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tion.50 If the defendant bears this burden, the state may bring evi-
dence to rebut such a showing.51 The Coffey requirements demand a
more assiduous effort on the part of a moving defendant than the
standard urged by the defendant. The defendant argued that the
mere showing of an insufficient record should be enough, under
Boykin, to uphold a motion to strike. However, the court applied the
more stringent Coffey requirements, which the defendant could not
hope to satisfy solely on the basis of a silent trial court record.52 The
court refused to presume from a silent record that the defendant's
Boykin/Tahl rights had been violated.53 Thus, the defendant's mo-
tion failed to allege actual denial of his constitutional rights,54 and
was properly denied by the trial court.55
F. Use of peremptory challenges to exclude a specific bias
from the jury does not violate the right to have a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community: People v. Turner.
In murder trials where the death penalty may be invoked, it is
common practice for the prosecution, during voir dire, to exercise
peremptory challenges to exclude all persons with reservations about
capital punishment. This practice was challenged in People v. Tur-
ner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984). The de-
fendant, Turner, was convicted on two counts of first degree murder
during the commission of a burglary. He was subsequently sentenced
to death.
On appeal, Turner claimed the People's exclusion by peremptory
challenge of all persons with reservations about capital punishment
denied him his constitutional right to a jury chosen from a represen-
tative cross-section of the community.
While the use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors
because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on
racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds violates the right to trial
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The defendant in Sunstine acknowledged that a Boykin reversal would not
result in this case were the evidentiary requirements of Coffey to apply. 36 Cal. 3d at
922, 687 P.2d at 912, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
53. Id. at 924, 687 P.2d at 914, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 717. Indeed, there need be no such
presumption, just as Boykin refused to presume a waiver of the defendant's rights
from a silent record. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
54. 36 Cal. 3d at 924, 687 P.2d at 914, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
55. Id.
by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, the
supreme court refused to condemn the practice of using peremptory
challenges to eliminate a specific bias from the jury. A specific atti-
tude relating to the particular case on trial transcends racial, reli-
gious, ethnic and other similar grounds. That a specific juror attitude
has been eliminated from the jury is the natural result of the parties'
historic and important right to exclude a limited number of jurors for
fear of bias.
Since the court was unable to find a constitutional infirmity in the
use of peremptory challenges on the basis of specific juror attitudes
on the death penalty, the defendant's challenge failed.
G. Cellmate informant held not to be a police agent; error
not to instruct on intent to kill element of felony-
murder special circumstance: People v. Whitt.
In People v. Whitt, 1 the supreme court, in addition to reviewing the
effects of a failure to instruct the jury concerning the intent to kill
element in a special circumstances case, and adequacy of a jury in-
struction on jury note-taking, also further defined the circumstances
under which an accused's statements to a cellmate, who passes the in-
formation on to the police, will be admissible at trial.
The defendant was charged with murder.2 A special circumstance
was alleged in connection with the murder charge as the killing was
committed while the defendant was engaged in a robbery. 3 While in
custody, the defendant revealed to his cellmate, DeLoach, the details
of the offense.4 DeLoach reported the appellant's confessions to the
police. 5 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress
the statements made to DeLoach. At trial, DeLoach testified against
the defendant. The jury found the defendant guilty and sentenced
him to death.
In its review of the defendant's appeal, the supreme court first con-
sidered the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that proof of in-
tent to kill is essential to sustain a felony-murder special
circumstance allegation under the 1978 death penalty law.6
1. 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984). Opinion by Bird, C.J.,
with Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate concur-
ring and dissenting opinion by Lucas, J.
2. Id at 728, 685 P.2d at 1162, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
3. Id.
4. Id at 730, 685 P.2d at 1163-64, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
5. Id,
6. See Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1983). In Carlos, the court held that under the 1978 death penalty initiative, which
enacted California Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17), proof of an intent to kill is re-
quired. Although the statutory provision was unclear as to whether intent to kill was
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Pursuant to Carlos v. Superior Court,7 a jury instruction that the
jury must find proof of intent to kill in a felony murder special cir-
cumstance is required unless one of the four exceptions enunciated in
People v. Garcia is present.8 In this case, none of the exceptions
were applicable. First, the defendant was not acquitted of the special
circumstance allegation. 9 Second, he never conceded the issue of in-
tent in the guilt phase-he simply did not realize intent was in is-
sue.
1 0 Third, while the parties did recognize that the defendant's
intent to kill was in issue in the penalty phase, the defense evidence
could not be dismissed as "not worthy of consideration."" Finally,
no other instruction squarely presented the question of intent to
kill.12
Accordingly, as there was no basis for concluding that the omission
of the intent-to-kill element from the special circumstance instruc-
tion was harmless, the death penalty judgment was reversed.13
Next, the supreme court considered the more difficult and contro-
versial issue of whether the defendant's statements to his cellmate
should have been suppressed under the fifth and sixth amendments
to the United States Constitution. 14
an essential element of the felony-murder circumstance, the court held such construc-
tion was required by the language of the initiative and by applicable principles of stat-
utory construction requiring ambiguities in penal statutes to be interpreted in favor of
the defendant and statutes to be construed to avoid constitutional problems.
7. Id.
8. 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984). The jury need not be
instructed that it must find proof of an intent to kill in a felony-murder special cir-
cumstances case if: 1) The jury instruction eliminating the issue of intent is given in
connection with an offense for which the defendant was acquitted and does not affect
the offense for which the defendant was convicted; 2) The defendant concedes the in-
tent issue; 3) The question of intent was resolved against the defendant under other
properly given jury instructions; or 4) The record shows sufficient evidence to find in-
tent as a matter of law. Id. at 554-56, 684 P.2d at 834-36, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 273-75. See
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87 (1983) (regarding exceptions 1 & 2 supra); Peo-
ple v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 768 n.20, 523 P.2d 267, 287 n.20, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 487
n.20 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. Thornton v. California, 420 U.S. 924 (1975) (regard-
ing exception 4); People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 721, 518 P.2d 913, 924, 112 Cal. Rptr.
1, 13 (1974) (regarding exception 3); People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 685, 504 P.2d
1256, 1264, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 800 (1973).
9. 36 Cal. 3d at 735, 685 P.2d at 1167, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d at 556, 684 P.2d at 836, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 275).
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 736, 685 P.2d at 1167, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
13. Id.
14. The defendant claimed his fifth amendment right was violated because
DeLoach was a police agent and had to give Miranda warnings before any interroga-
tion. Id. at 744, 685 P.2d at 1173, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 822. The defendant's sixth amend-
ment challenge of a violation of his right to counsel was based on the fact that since he
The circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements to his
cellmate were of particular importance to the court. DeLoach, hav-
ing escaped from prison, was being escorted back to California by a
detective. While en route, the detective gave DeLoach his card and
asked him to contact him if he heard about any homicides. Unbe-
knownst to the detective, DeLoach was a police informant.15
DeLoach was placed in a cell with the defendant. Both men recog-
nized one another from San Quentin and within hours the defendant
had revealed his offense and guilt to DeLoach, whereupon DeLoach
requested a meeting with the detective.16 DeLoach gave the detec-
tive a brief version of the defendant's story and also mentioned that
the defendant intended to present a defense that he was drunk at the
time of the robbery.17 At the conclusion of the meeting, the detective
warned DeLoach not to solicit any further details from the defend-
ant, but if he happened to hear anything else from the defendant,
nothing could be done about that.18
Some weeks later, DeLoach met with another detective and told
him he had had further conversations with the defendant. DeLoach
then gave a detailed account of the defendant's story.19 Although
DeLoach eventually testified about the defendant's statements, he
was never given any favorable treatment in exchange for the
information.2 0
In its examination of the relationship between the Sheriff's De-
partment and DeLoach, and whether it was significant that the detec-
tive expressly told DeLoach not to question the defendant any
further about the crime, the court began with United States v.
Henry.2 1 That decision "explained what conduct on the part of the
government and/or an informant would amount to deliberate elicita-
tion." 22 From Henry, the court concluded that "in deciding whether
information has been 'deliberately elicited,' the courts must focus on
the state's conduct as a whole, rather than on the informant's."2 3
Under Henry, "it is not significant whether the informant or the ac-
was represented by counsel at the time of his statements to DeLoach, the government
was not free to question him without the presence of his attorney. Id. at 739 n.10, 685
P.2d at 1169 n.10, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.10.
15. Id. at 737, 685 P.2d at 1168, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 737-38, 685 P.2d at 1168, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
18. Id. at 738, 685 P.2d at 1168, 205 Cal. IRptr. at 817.
19. Id. at 738, 685 P.2d at 1169, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
20. Id.
21. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
22. In Henry, government agents contacted and paid a prisoner, who was housed
in the same cell with Henry, to report any statements made by Henry. However, the
authorities expressly advised the informant not to initiate any conversation with
Henry or question him about the charges against him. Id. at 268.
23. 36 Cal. 3d at 741, 685 P.2d at 1170, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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cused initiated the conversation."24 What is significant is "whether
the state has created a situation likely to provide it with incriminat-
ing statements from an accused. If it has, it may not disclaim respon-
sibility for this information by the simple device of telling an
informant to 'listen but don't ask.' "25
Another factor critical in determining whether the government has
deliberately elicited statements is whether the government has pro-
vided any kind of incentive to the informant to obtain the informa-
tion.2 6 Where the informant interrogates an accused on his own
initiative rather than at the request of the government, the govern-
ment cannot be said to have deliberately elicited the statements. 27
Moreover, if the informant was not paid in cash or in the form of a
lenient sentencing, the informant cannot be found to have acted at
the behest of the government.28
In light of the foregoing, the court concluded that the defendant's
statements to DeLoach were not deliberately elicited by the govern-
ment. The question was a very close and difficult one because the
detective who spoke with DeLoach offered to speak to the prosecutor
on DeLoach's behalf.29 This fact raised a serious concern as to
whether DeLoach had an incentive to extract more statements from
the defendant. 30 Moreover, the police must have realized that
DeLoach hoped for a reward in exchange for the information.31
However, since the detectives were never aware that DeLoach was
24. Id. "Nichols was not a passive listener; rather, he had 'some conversations
with Mr. Henry' while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements were 'the
product of this conversation.'" 447 U.S. at 271. See also Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964) (no inquiry was made into whether Massiah or the informant first
raised the subject of the crime under investigation).
25. 36 Cal. 3d at 742, 685 P.2d at 1171, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 820. See also United States
v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (confirming that it is immaterial that the
informant did not initiate the conversation).
26. 36 Cal. 3d at 742, 685 P.2d at 1172, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 821. Another consideration
is that "the mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused; confinement may
bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the
ploys of undercover Government agents." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. See
also Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. 1219, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 678 F.2d 791 (9th
Cir. 1982); People v. Superior Court (Sosa), 145 Cal. App. 3d 581, 597, 194 Cal. Rptr.
525, 535 (1983).
27. See Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983)
(informant collected information out of curiosity).
28. Id. at 135-36; see also United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d at 632-38.
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 744, 685 P.2d at 1172-73, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 744, 685 P.2d at 1173, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
a government informant, "the mere acceptance of his information,
even with the promise to talk to the prosecutor, [was] not sufficient
encouragement to hold the police accountable." 32 The police neither
made any promises in exchange for the information, nor took any ac-
tion that would indicate leniency.33 In spite of the close facts, the
court concluded that DeLoach's conduct was not attributable to the
state.34
Additionally, the argument that DeLoach was a police agent and
therefore required to give Miranda35 warnings before any interroga-
tion failed to persuade the court that the statements were obtained in
violation of the appellant's fifth amendment rights. The supreme
court refused to disturb the trial court's conclusion that DeLoach was
not a government agent but was a private citizen.36
Lastly, the supreme court briefly considered whether the court had
erred in failing to provide the jury with a cautionary instruction on
jury note-taking. Although section 1137 of the Penal Code expressly
allows note-taking,37 the defendant contended a cautionary instruc-
tion should have been given to inform the jury of the inherent dan-
gers of note-taking.38 Inasmuch as the trial court did provide a brief
cautionary instruction, the court held there was no prejudicial
error.
39
Having found that a jury instruction regarding proof of intent to
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that he was denied effective counsel at
trial because his attorney did not raise a sixth amendment claim against DeLoach's
testimony. In light of the supreme court's conclusion that the defendant's rights were
not violated, this argument was rejected. Id.
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. 36 Cal. 3d at 745, 685 P.2d at 1173, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 822. See also In re Deborah
C., 30 Cal. 3d 125, 130-31, 635 P.2d 446, 448, 177 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854 (1981).
37. Section 1137 states in pertinent part: "Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury
may take with them ... notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial,
taken by themselves or any of them, but none taken by any other person." CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1137 (West Supp. 1984). A court of appeal has held that the use of note
pads by the jurors "is endorsed by section 1137 of the Penal Code." People v. Cline,
222 Cal. App. 2d 597, 601, 35 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422-23 (1963).
38. See, e.g., United States v. MacLean, 578 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (jurors might
rely on notes which are inaccurate, meager, careless, loosely deficient, partial and alto-
gether incomplete; use them for the purpose of misleading fellow jurors; or not listen
to important testimony because of concern with note-taking); People v. DiLuca, 85
A.D.2d 439, 444-45, 448 N.Y.S.2d 730, 734 (1982).
39. 36 Cal. 3d at 747-48, 685 P.2d at 1175, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The trial judge cau-
tioned the jurors thusly:
[b]e careful as to the amount of notes that you take. I'd rather that you ob-
serve the witness, observe the demeanor of that witness, listen to how that
person testifies rather than taking copious notes. . . .[I]f you do not recall ex-
actly as to what a witness might have said or you disagree, for instance, during
the deliberation [sic] as to what a witness may have said, we can reread that
transcript back by that witness back to you. Remember that aspect of it.
Id. (sic in original).
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kill in a felony-murder special circumstance allegation was lacking,
the judgment of death was reversed. As the court found no violation
of the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights, the judgment of
guilt was affirmed.
VII. EVIDENCE
A. Newsperson has qualified privilege in a civil case to
withhold disclosure of identity of confidential sources
and unpublished information: Mitchell v. Superior
Court.
In Mitchell v. Superior Court,' the court was asked to decide
whether in California a reporter or publisher has a qualified privilege
in a civil case to withhold disclosure of the identity of confidential
news sources and of unpublished information provided by those
sources. In deciding in the affirmative, the court felt that while it
could not ignore first amendment values, it had to recognize the pol-
icy of full disclosure of all relevant evidence.2 The court therefore
concluded, as other courts had before it, that reporters and publish-
ers have a qualified privilege in a civil case to withhold their sources. 3
The scope of the privilege will differ from case to case, and depend
upon an examination of certain interrelated factors.4
I. FACTS
The Synanon Church (Synanon) filed a libel action against the
Reader's Digest, David and Cathy Mitchell, David McDonald and
others when the Reader's Digest published an article describing how
the Mitchells had won the Pulitzer Prize for reports and editorials
critical of Synanon appearing in a weekly newspaper. 5 The Digest ar-
ticle, Synanon contended, was libelous since writer David McDonald
had written in the article that Synanon had obtained donations for a
string of drug rehabilitation centers, and that little rehabilitation
work had occurred although donations were solicited on that basis.
Synanon claimed the statements implied that Synanon fraudulently
1. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984). Opinion by Broussard,
Acting C.J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.
2. Id. at 276, 690 P.2d at 629, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
3. Id at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
4. Id
5. A full recitation of the facts and a description of the Reader's Digest article
appears in the companion case of Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d
244, 690 P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1984).
attempted to make money on the basis of rehabilitation centers that
were not successful.
In the trial court, the Reader's Digest disclosed its sources for the
article written by McDonald, but Synanon wished to go beyond that
point and force discovery of the Mitchell's sources. Synanon wished
to show that the Mitchells were selective in their reliance on some
evidence in contrast to other evidence favorable to Synanon. The
Mitchells objected, and uncertain whether the court had decided on
the issue of privilege, withheld the documents requested by Syna-
non's discovery motions even after the court ordered their produc-
tion. The Mitchells asked the court to clarify the order and the court
responded that the privilege the Mitchells asserted "does not exist in
California."6 The Mitchells then sought a writ of prohibition to bar
enforcement of the court's order.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The Mitchells, as a party to the lawsuit, sought to assert a nonstat-
utory privilege based on protections of freedom of the press found in
the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.7 The
supreme court recognized that a balance would have to be struck be-
tween the competing considerations of a free, unfettered press, and
the need for all relevant evidence in a civil case. A free press is nec-
essary as a source of public information to allow citizens to make in-
formed choices in their lives, and removes the deterring effect of
compelled disclosure.8 On the other side of the ledger, however, an
individual who has been libelled is legitimately interested in his rep-
utation and the assertion of a reporter's privilege would impede that
individual's ability to prove actual malice.9 Further, the "concept
that it is the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law has roots
fully as deep in [this nation's] history as does the guarantee of a free
press."10
The conflict could not be resolved by a blanket rule, the court pre-
ferring to hold that each case must be examined by the trial court
"balancing the asserted interests in light of the facts of the case
before it."11 The overwhelming majority of courts deciding the privi-
6. 37 Cal. 3d at 274, 690 P.2d at 627-28, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
7. Id. at 274, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
8. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Baker v. F & F In-
vestment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
9. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) ("it is plain enough that the ...
privilege ... would constitute a substantial interference with the ability of a defama-
tion plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice").
10. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
11. 37 Cal. 3d at 276, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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lege issue had taken that position.12 A California court of appeal had
also taken the case-by-case position.'3 The balancing test that the
court contemplated involved a consideration of factors it believed
were interrelated. 14 The court set out five factors in determining the
scope of the qualified reporter's privilege.
The first factor was the "nature of the litigation and whether the
reporter is a party" to the lawsuit.'5 The court held that, in a civil
suit wherein the reporter is a party, disclosure is appropriate.16 As
the court noted, successful assertion of the privilege may shield a
party reporter from liability, since proof of actual malice in cases in-
volving public figures might depend on knowing the reporter's in-
formant.17 In the present case, the Mitchells were parties to the case,
suggesting disclosure. The District of Columbia Circuit Court in Zer-
elli v. Smith noted, however, that in such cases disclosure should not
be automatic; rather, the reporter's privilege should be recognized
where other factors suggest disclosure is inappropriate.' 8
The second factor is "the relevance of the information sought to
plaintiff's cause of action."'19 Mere relevance would not be enough to
compel disclosure; the information must go "'to the heart of [a]
plaintiff's claim.' ",20 In the present case, there was a dispute over the
relevance of the information sought by Synanon. Synanon urged that
the information would reveal that the Mitchells lacked any reliable
sources. The Mitchells argued that the real issue was whether they
conspired with Reader's Digest to publish the article, making the
identity of sources irrelevant. The court, however, reasoned that the
identity of informants would be relevant in the event the Mitchells
had furnished defamatory material to Reader's Digest with expecta-
tions that it would be published. If so, the Mitchells would have ac-
ted with actual malice and could be held liable on a republication
theory.2 ' The suit failed to allege republication, however, and the
scope of the materials Synanon sought disclosed was too broad to
12. Id. (See cases cited in the opinion).
13. Id. (citing KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1982)) (balance the right of freedom of the press with a citizen's obligation to testify).
14. 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Zerelli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
18. Zerelli, 656 F.2d at 714.
19. 37 Cal. 3d at 280, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
20. Id. (citing Garland, 259 F.2d at 550).
21. 37 Cal. 3d at 281, 690 P.2d at 633, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
"justify overriding the reporter's privilege."22
A third consideration is that discovery is usually denied unless the
plaintiff has exhausted all alternatives to obtain the information.23
Plaintiff Synanon had failed to exhaust its alternatives in this case.
Fourth, courts will be required to "consider the importance of pro-
tecting confidentiality" in each case.24 This consideration amounts to
a balancing test of its own, as the court reasoned that "when the in-
formation relates to matters of great public importance, and when
the risk of harm to the source is a substantial one, the court may re-
fuse to require disclosure." 25
The final consideration is that courts may require the plaintiff to
prove a prima facie case that the alleged defamatory statements are
false before disclosure is required.26 This requirement would, in ef-
fect, insure that the previous considerations were all relevant to the
case. To require disclosure where the plaintiff had not even been li-
belled would be injurious to the concept of a free press.27 Here,
Synanon failed to even attempt a prima facie showing of falsity.28
Since Synanon's request failed each of the considerations the court
deemed important, it was held the privilege should stand in this case.
The court issued the writ of prohibition requested by the Mitchells.29
III. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
This case was one of first impression,30 and the court's decision set
out for the first time in California guidelines to be followed by courts
in civil cases where a party or witness claims the qualified reporter's
privilege.
22. Id. at 281-82, 690 P.2d at 633-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
23. Id. at 282, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161. It seems logical that this re-
quirement must be read in conjunction with other relevant factors. Although a party
may have exhausted all recourse, the information may be completely irrelevant as re-
quired by the second factor, so that the reporter's privilege might prevail,
24. Id.
25. Id. at 283, 609 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161. Perhaps a clearer case for the
privilege could be made where the information is not of public importance while the
harm to the informant may be great. At the other extreme, it may matter little to the
informant if he is exposed.
26. Id.
27. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir.
1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973).
28. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 283, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
29. Id. at 284, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
30. Id. at 272, 690 P.2d at 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
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B. Evidence of prior sex crimes was improperly admitted
since it failed to show a characteristic method, plan or
scheme: People v. Alcala.
In People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1984), the defendant was convicted of one count of first degree mur-
der, and one count of forcible kidnapping. Inasmuch as the murder
was committed in the course of a kidnapping, the special circum-
stances provision of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)(ii) applied. The
defendant was sentenced to death, leading to an automatic appeal.
The fundamental issue in this case was the identity of the twelve
year old female victim's abductor and killer. The jury's determina-
tion that the defendant was guilty was based upon the hotly disputed
testimony of jailhouse informants and a forest service worker who
discovered the mutilated body seven days before it was discovered by
someone else but failed to report it. Additionally, evidence of the de-
fendant's prior child molestation offenses were admitted to show a
consistent modus operandi. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a), (b) (West
1966).
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence at trial was le-
gally insufficient to convict him of premeditated murder and forcible
kidnapping. In addition, the defendant argued that the improper in-
troduction of his prior crimes constituted reversible error.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument of insuffi-
cient evidence. Circumstantial evidence made it highly unlikely that
the victim willingly accompanied the defendant to the death scene.
Also, the evidence presented about the murder met the planning,
motive, and methodology requirements needed to establish a prima
facie case of premeditated murder. The defendant's methodology to
kill the victim was very "particular and exacting," he had the requi-
site motive to kill-to eliminate the only witness to the crime-and
there was, most importantly, substantial evidence of a plan calculated
to result in a killing.
However, it was the introduction of the defendant's prior crimes of
child molestation that provided the pivotal point in the court's review
of the defendant's case. The court concluded that evidence of the de-
fendant's past crimes served only to reveal a predisposition to child
molesting rather than a consistent and particular modus operandi.
Therefore, the evidence was inadmissible under California Evidence
Code section 1101(a).
Admission of the prior crimes evidence constituted reversible error
since the prejudicial nature of the crimes may have improperly influ-
enced the jury. Thus, the defendant's convictions were reversed.
C. Testimony aided by hypnosis is barred in all pending
cases as of March 11, 1982: People v. Guerra.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Guerra,1 the supreme court determined whether its
ruling in People v. Shirley2 that the use of hypnosis to restore or im-
prove the memory of a potential witness is not accepted as a reliable
procedure by a consensus of the relevant scientific community, and
hence the testimony of such a witness is inadmissible as to all mat-
ters that were the subject of the hypnotic session,3 applied to wit-
nesses who were hypnotized before the Shirley ruling.4 Upon
reviewing its own settled retroactivity precedent and that of the
United States Supreme Court, the court determined that Shirley ap-
plied to all cases not yet final as of the date of its determination-
March 11, 1982.5
II. BACKGROUND
The defendants were convicted, by jury trials, of forcible rape and
attempted forcible oral copulation, with allegations that they "'vol-
untarily acted in concert' to commit the offense charged." 6 Due to
the fact that the victim's story and that of the co-defendants were
contradictory,7 the police employed hypnosis on the victim to im-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
with Bird, C.J., and Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate concur-
ring opinion by Kaus, J., with Grodin, J., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by
Lucas, J.
2. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
3. Id at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804-05, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
4. 37 Cal. 3d at 390, 690 P.2d at 637, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
5. Id. at 385, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
6. Id. at 391, 690 P.2d at 637, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 164. See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 264.1, 288a(d) (West Supp. 1985).
7. The victim maintained that, upon realizing a possible rape, she asked
Murkidjanian if she could get her diaphragm; both defendants removed her upper
clothing; Murkidjanian tried to attain an erection by masturbating; when his attempts
failed, he tried to force her to orally copulate him; that his flaccid penis penetrated
her; and that Guerra sat in a chair observing and later comforted her. Id. at 392-93, 690
P.2d at 638-39, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 165. During subsequent interviews, the victim told the
same story except that she stated there had been no penetration. Id. at 394-95, 690
P.2d at 640, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
One of the defendants, Guerra, denied helping. Murkidjanian take off the victim's
clothing and further testified that he found the victim and Guerra lying naked on the
bed. Id. at 393-94, 690 P.2d at 639, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 166. He also confirmed that
Murkidjanian did not have an erection, was attempting to masturbate and that he
(Guerra) later comforted the victim. Id Murkidjanian's defense was consent. He de-
nied that the victim resisted; his belief that the victim had consented was due to the
fact that the victim volunteered to get her diaphragm; he was too drunk to get an erec-
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prove or restore her memory of the events in question, particularly
as to whether penetration had actually occurred.8 Through hypnosis,
the victim was able to remember that penetration occurred.9 The de-
fendants moved to suppress the victim's testimony on the ground
that hypnotically induced evidence is too unreliable to be admitted
into criminal trials.10 These motions were denied. On appeal to the
supreme court, both defendants contended that the case was con-
trolled by the rule enunciated in People v. Shirley,11 and that applica-
tion of the Shirley rule would require the court to hold that
admission of the posthypnotic testimony was erroneous and
prejudicial.12
III. ANALYSIS
A. Rules of Retroactivity
In determining whether the Shirley rule should be retroactively
applied to all cases not yet final as of the date of the decision, the
court first discussed the rules of retroactivity. The first step in deter-
mining retroactivity is to ask whether the rule in question establishes
a new rule of law.13 If it does not, "'no question of retroactivity
arises' because there is no material change in the law."14 The deci-
sion merely becomes part of the body of case law of the state, and
"under ordinary principles of stare decisis applies in all cases not yet
final."15
tion; after failing in his attempt to masturbate, he asked the victim if she would orally
copulate him. The victim refused. He got angry, the victim began to cry and this
scared him into giving up the effort. He denied penetration. Id. at 394, 690 P.2d at 639,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67.
8. Id. at 394-98, 690 P.2d at 640-42, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 167-69.
9. Id. at 396-97, 690 P.2d at 641, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
10. Id. at 397, 690 P.2d at 641, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
11. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 398, 690 P.2d at 642-43, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70.
13. Id. at 399, 690 P.2d at 643, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
14. Id. See also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982); People v. Gar-
cia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 547-48, 684 P.2d 826, 830, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268-69 (1984); Donaldson
v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 36, 672 P.2d 110, 117, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711-12 (1983).
15. 37 Cal. 3d at 399, 690 P.2d at 643, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 170. Common examples of
decisions that do not establish new law are those which explain or refine the holding
of a prior case, those which extend the rule of law to a different fact situation, those
which draw a conclusion that was clearly implied in or anticipated by previous opin-
ions, or those in which the court gave effect to a statutory rule that had previously
been misinterpreted or not definitely addressed. See, e.g., Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d at 549, 684
P.2d at 831, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (effect given to a statutory rule not previously defini-
tively addressed); Gallick v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 855, 859-60, 489 P.2d 573, 575, 97
Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1971) (reaffirmation of a settled principle which intervening appel-
If the decision establishes a new rule, the second inquiry become
whether there was a prior rule to the contrary.16 If no prior rule ex-
ists, the new rule applies in all cases not yet final, the rationale being
that "there cannot have been any justifiable reliance on an old rule
when no old rule existed."17 Since unjustified reliance is not a bar to
retroactivity,18 in all such cases the ordinary assumption of retrospec-
tive application takes full effect.' 9 Common examples of situations
which establish a new rule, where there was no prior rule to the con-
trary, include cases in which the court resolves a conflict between
lower court decisions2O or addresses an issue not previously presented
to the courts. 21 Additionally, if the court finds a new rule constitutes
a "clear break with the past," the court may choose to make, on the
grounds of public policy, an exception to the general rule of retro-
spective application.22 Such clear breaks with the past occur in lim-
ited situations, i.e., when the decision explicitly overrules a precedent
of the supreme court, disapproves a practice impliedly sanctioned by
a prior decision of the supreme court, or disapproves a long-standing
and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous
body of lower court authorities.23
If one of the three limited situations exists, the California courts
weigh three factors, summarized in Stovall v. Denno,24 to determine
whether to make an exception to the rule of retroactive application
on the ground of public policy: "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement au-
thorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administra-
tion of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 25
The Stovall test, which has been labeled functionally as a bipartite
test 26 and on certain occasions as a unipartite test,27 has been most
late court decisions weakened); People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 394, 482 P.2d 633, 636,
93 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 (1971) (misconstrued statutory rule is clarified).
16. 37 Cal. 3d at 399-400, 690 P.2d at 643, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
18. Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (1984).
19. 37 Cal. 3d at 399-400, 690 P.2d at 643, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
20. See, e.g., People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 556-60, 674 P.2d 1318, 1323-26, 199
Cal. Rptr. 60, 65-68 (1984).
21. 37 Cal. 3d at 400, 690 P.2d at 644, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
22. Id. at 401, 690 P.2d at 644, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
23. Id, See also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982); Donaldson v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 24, 37, 672 P.2d 110, 118, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1983).
24. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
25. Donaldson, 35 Cal. 3d at 38, 672 P.2d at 118, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. See also
In re Joe R., 27 Cal. 3d 496, 511-12, 612 P.2d 927, 936-37, 165 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846-47
(1980); People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 559 P.2d 1028, 1034, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409, 415
(1977).
26. Although the Stovall test is traditionally described as tripartite, that is mis-
leading. The second and third factors are essentially the same, thus functionally mak-
ing the test bipartite. 37 Cal. 3d at 401-02, 690 P.2d at 645, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
[W]hen the retroactive application of a new rule causes a substantial effect on
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consistently applied in cases in which the main purpose of a new rule
is "to promote reliable determinations of guilt or innocence." 28
Where the major purpose of the new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an
aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function
and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past tri-
als, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-
faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or ac-
cepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed
to require prospective application in these circumstances. 2 9
the administration of justice, it is primarily because there was a substantial
reliance on the old rule by law enforcement authorities; conversely, when that
reliance was minimal, retroactive application will usually have a similarly
minimal effect on the administration of justice.
Id.
27. The bipartite test is reduced to a unipartite function where "the first factor-
the purpose of the new rule-points plainly towards retroactivity or prospectivity." Id.
at 401-02, 690 P.2d at 645, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 172. "[T]he factors of reliance and burden
on the administration of justice are of significant relevance only when the question of
retroactivity is a close one after the purpose of the new rule is considered." In re
Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 404, 410, 475 P.2d 841, 844, 90 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1970). When that
purpose clearly favors retroactivity or prospectivity, it will be given effect without re-
gard to the weight of the remaining factors. Accord Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 251 (1969).
28. 37 Cal. 3d at 402, 690 P.2d at 645, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
29. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (footnote omitted).
Since Williams, the United States Supreme Court has held a new rule retroactive
on this ground in the following instances: United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982)
(fourth amendment decisions in general, and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980),
in particular, are retroactive in the sense that they apply on direct appeal to all judg-
ments not final); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (wherein the Court gave ret-
roactive effect to the rule of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), which required
unanimity for conviction of a nonpetty offense by a six-person jury); Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (wherein the issue was the retroactivity of the rule
enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1971), which barred the states from
shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion on any element of the crime); and
Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (where the Court determined whether
the rule in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which required the states to comply with
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings, was retroac-
tive).
For decisions by the California Supreme Court which are in accord with the United
States Supreme Court, see Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158
Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979) (interpretation of Penal Code section 647(a) given retroactive ef-
fect); People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977) ("Allen-
type charge" overruled and applied retroactively); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306,
535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975) (major purpose of retroactive rule is to over-
come an aspect of the proceeding which substantially impairs the truth-finding pro-
cess); In re Montgomery, 2 Cal. 3d 863, 471 P.2d 15, 87 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1970) (full
retroactive effect given to the rule of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), where the
court found that a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion is violated when he is convicted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing testi-
mony of an absent witness, unless the prosecution has made a good faith attempt to
secure the witness' presence at trial).
B. Application of Retroactivity Rules to the Shirley Decision
Having set forth the circumstances under which a decision will be
given retroactive effect, the court began its analysis as to whether the
Shirley rule should be applied retroactively to the date of its decision.
First, the court found that Shirley established a new rule of law.30
Second, there was no previous California rule which, contrary to
Shirley, held that the testimony of a witness who has been hypno-
tized to restore his memory is admissible in California courts.31
Moreover, since Shirley did not explicitly overrule a precedent of
the court, it did not represent a clear break with the past.32 Nor did
Shirley fall within the second category of decisions which disapprove
a practice impliedly sanctioned by prior decision of the court.
3 3
"[T]he repeated references in . . . opinions to the unreliability and
inadmissibility of hypnotically induced testimony make it inconceiv-
able that anyone could fairly have read them as encouraging the use
of hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory." 34
Finally, Shirley did not represent a "clear break from the past." It
did not fall within the third category of cases which disapprove a
long-standing and widespread practice expressly approved by a near
unanimous body of lower court authority.35 While "prior to Shirley
there were a number of instances in which certain police depart-
ments in California used hypnosis in an attempt to restore or im-
prove a witness' memory, it does not appear that it was both a
'longstanding' and 'widespread' practice within the meaning of the
retroactivity precedents." 36 "More important, there was no express
approval of any such practice by a near-unanimous body of lower-
court precedents." 37
Inasmuch as the court's analysis found there was no "'old rule' to
the contrary in California, Shirley did not constitute a 'clear break
30. 37 Cal. 3d at 406, 690 P.2d at 648, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
31. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 665, 602 P.2d 738, 753-54, 159 Cal. Rptr.
818, 833-34 (1979) (exclusion of a tape recording of statements made by a defense wit-
ness while hypnotized); People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 733, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31
Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (1963) (exclusion of a tape recording of statements made by the
defendant while hypnotized); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 878, 366 P.2d 314, 319-20,
16 Cal. Rptr. 898, 903-04 (1961) (physician not permitted to testify about the defend-
ant's mental state at time of crimes which was elicited through hypnosis); Cornell v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 102, 338 P.2d 447, 449 (1959) (statements a defendant
makes under hypnosis are inadmissible but may serve as leads to the discovery of
other admissible evidence); People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665-66, 49 P. 1049, 1053
(1897) (law of United States does not recognize hypnotism).
32. 37 Cal. 3d at 408-09, 690 P.2d at 649-50, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id
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with the past' and hence must be given normal application to all
cases not yet final."3 8
In spite of the above holding, the court hypothesized that, assum-
ing arguendo Shirley did amount to a "clear break" which in appro-
priate circumstances could be limited to prospective operation, it
would proceed to apply the Stovall test to determine whether pro-
spective application was warranted on the grounds of public policy.3 9
Using the rule enunciated in People v. Kelly40 and Frye v. United
States,41 that evidence based on a new scientific technique is admissi-
ble only on a showing that it is generally accepted as reliable in the
scientific community in which it was developed,42 the court deter-
mined that the use of hypnosis to restore a witness' memory was gen-
erally held to be unreliable in the scientific community.43
Additionally, the purpose of Shirley was "to overcome an aspect of
the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function
and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts
in past trials."44 Accordingly, whether or not Shirley replaced a prior
rule to the contrary, the decision applied to all cases not yet final in
California courts at the time it was decided.45
C. Respondent's Attack on the Shirley Rule Itself
In the alternative, the respondent also attacked the Shirley rule it-
self. The respondent contended that subsequent developments in sci-
entific literature and case law had undermined Shirley to the extent
that the decision should be reconsidered or overruled.46
With regard to developments in scientific literature, the respon-
38. Id. at 411, 690 P.2d at 651, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 178. The respondent relied on two
cases: People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980); People v. Colli-
gan, 91 Cal. App. 3d 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1979). However, the court held these
cases, at most, gave "implied support" for the use of hypnosis to restore a witness'
memory. 37 Cal. 3d at 410, 690 P.2d at 651, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 178. To constitute a "clear
break from the past" such practice must be expressly sanctioned by the lower courts.
Md.
39. 37 Cal. 3d at 411, 690 P.2d at 651-52, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
40. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
41. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14; Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30-32, 37, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 148. See also People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980)
(wherein the Kelly-Frye test was not met).
43. 37 Cal. 3d at 412, 690 P.2d at 652-53, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
44. Id. at 412-13, 690 P.2d at 652-53, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80 (citing Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977)).
45. 37 Cal. 3d at 413, 690 P.2d at 653, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
46. Id. at 417, 690 P.2d at 656, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
dent attempted to substantiate its argument with two articles by pro-
fessionals in the behavioral sciences.47 The first article, The Shirley
Decision: The Cure is Worse than the Disease, was found to be a fron-
tal assault on the Shirley decision itself. It represented the minority
view on the risks of admitting posthypnotic testimony.48 Since it was
only the minority view,49 this piece of literature did not provide any
evidence that use of hypnosis was supported by a clear majority of
members in the scientific community.50
The second article relied upon by the respondent, Hypnotic Hy-
permnesia: A Critical Review, by Helmut Relinger, Ph.D., was even
less persuasive because the studies on which its premise was based all
predated the Shirley decision.5 1
The court, less than satisfied with the respondent's authorities,
then conducted its own survey of articles addressing the use of hyp-
nosis to restore a witness' memory.5 2 It concluded that the literature
was "remarkably uniform in [its] conclusion that if there is any in-
creased recall in hypnotic hypermnesia, it is purchased at the price of
increased errors and probably also an increase in the subject's mis-
placed confidence in those errors."53
Nor did the respondent's argument that recent case law dictated a
change in the Shirley rule serve as a pivotal point in the court's anal-
ysis. While courts of other states had declined to follow Shirley, the
court held that the authorities relied upon by the respondent4 did
47. At the time of the article, neither article was in print yet, however, the re-
spondent advised the court both were "soon to be published," but could only provide
the court with information as to where one article would appear. Id. at 417 n.28, 690
P.2d at 656 n.28, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.28.
48. Id at 418, 690 P.2d at 656-57, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
49. For articles discussing the minority view, see Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in
Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358 (1979);
Schafer & Rubio, Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J. CLINICAL & Ex-
PERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 81 (1978); Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence: Help or Hin-
drance?, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73 (1980).
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 418, 690 P.2d at 656, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
51. Id. at 418-19, 690 P.2d at 657, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
52. Id. at 419-24, 690 P.2d at 657-61, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 184-88.
53. Id. at 419, 690 P.2d at 657, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 184. See also Wagstaff, Hypnosis
and the Law: A Critical Review of Some Recent Proposals, 1983 CRIM. L. REV.
(LONDON) 152, 157.
54. See State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984) (state rejected all other
tests and adopted its own procedures); State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983)
(posthypnotic testimony admissible when it is "substantially the same" as witness'
prehypnotic statements); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (hypnotic testi-
mony must comply with safeguards); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983) (re-
jection of Hurd test); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983)
(requiring a pre-trial hearing on the "suggestiveness" of the hypnotic session in each
case). But see United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); State ex rel Col-
lins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Quintanar, 659
P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); People v.
Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453
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not represent a "new trend" as they sharply disagreed with one an-
other as to their holdings.55
Finally, the court entertained the respondent's final argument that
"many . . .courts have . . .declared a willingness to allow, under a
variety of restrictions, the introduction of 'prehypnotic evidence;' i.e.,
in certain circumstances the witness may be permitted to testify to
facts that he remembered before he was hypnotized." 56 The court
took a dim view of this suggestion.5 7 While the evidence is recalled
before hypnosis, it may be tainted since the evidence is put before the
jury after the witness has been hypnotized. Although Shirley did
hold one type of prehypnosis testimony admissible,58 the court was
unwilling to further extend Shirley due to the fact that the sound-
ness of that exception had been questioned in the scientific commu-
nity,5 9 thus preventing the court from changing its position.6 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the above analysis, the supreme court held steadfast to the
Shirley rule. The court held that the trial court had erred in denying
the defendants' motions to exclude the victim's posthypnotic testi-
mony.6 1 Since the victim's posthypnotic testimony was "virtually the
sole incriminating evidence against each defendant," 62 the court was
compelled to reverse the judgments.
N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177
(1984), and Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), wherein the
courts are consistent with the Shirley rule.
55. 37 Cal. 3d at 425, 690 P.2d at 661, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
56. Id. at 427, 690 P.2d at 663, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
57. Id.
58. Where a witness has testified at a preliminary hearing before being hypno-
tized, the witness' preliminary hearing testimony is admissible in lieu of the inadmissi-
ble posthypnotic testimony, provided only that the witness' disqualification has not
been procured by the prosecution for the purpose of preventing him from testifying.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 71-73 & n.60, 641 P.2d 775, 806-08 & n.60, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 274-
76 & n.60 (1982).
59. See, e.g., Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is It Compe-
tent?, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155, 195-202 (1983); Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice:
The Use of Hypnotically-Induced Testimony In Criminal Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV.
927, 969-74 (1983).
60. 37 Cal. 3d at 428-29, 690 P.2d at 664-65, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92. An additional
factor that prohibited the court from carving out an exception to the Shirley rule was
that the respondent had not fully briefed the issue. Id.
61. Id. at 429-30, 690 P.2d at 664-65, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
62. Id.
D. Cumulative effect of evidentiary and prosecutorial
errors require reversal of first degree murder and
robbery conviction: People v. Holt.
In People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1984), the supreme court reversed convictions for first degree mur-
der and robbery on the grounds that numerous evidentiary and
prosecutorial errors, which occurred during the trial, had a cumula-
tive prejudicial effect.
First, the court held it was error to allow testimony which por-
trayed the defendant as a drug abuser. The object of the crime in-
volved was not to obtain money to procure drugs. Since this
testimony only had a remote relation to the material facts of the rob-
bery and subsequent murder, the probative value of the defendant's
drug use was "outweighed by the inflammatory effect of this kind of
testimony on the jury."
Second, the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the de-
fendant had committed numerous burglaries with his co-defendant.
The relationship between the co-defendants was never in issue, hence
not relevant. The only purpose of this testimony was to show pro-
pensity to commit crimes in general. Under Evidence Code section
1101, the trial court should have excluded the testimony.
Third, evidence of the defendant's five prior burglary convictions
was held inadmissible. The supreme court determined that the rec-
ord did not reflect any attempt by the trial court to weigh the proba-
tive value of using more than one prior conviction against the
prejudicial effect of such evidence. Additionally, a conviction for bur-
glary does not necessarily involve an intent to deceive, defraud, lie, or
steal. Accordingly, use of these prior convictions for impeachment
was permissible only if the prosecution had demonstrated this evi-
dence involved theft or a dishonest act.
Fourth, it was error to admit evidence of the defendant's knowl-
edge of prison gangs. There was no showing that the defendant was a
member of any gang or that he shared a common membership with
any party to the action. Other than blackening the defendant's char-
acter, this evidence had no probative value.
Fifth, the trial court erred in permitting a defense witness to be
improperly impeached with four murder convictions and three
counts of conspiracy to commit murder. While these crimes indi-
cated, at most, a character trait for violence, they did not indicate the
witness was disposed to falsifying.
Sixth, in the closing argument of the guilt phase of the trial, the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by stating that if thE
jury accepted the defense's theory, they would be guaranteeing thE
defendant a parole date. Although the trial court had instricted the
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prosecutor not to talk about a parole date, the trial court failed to
properly admonish the jury not to consider the defendant's possible
punishment.
Based upon all of the above, the court determined the cumulative
effect of these errors amounted to prejudicial error, thereby warrant-
ing the setting aside of the convictions for first degree murder and
robbery.
E. On proper showing, testimony of psychologist who is
qualified expert on factors that may influence
eyewitness identification is admissible, and it was
reversible error for trial court to bar such testimony:
People v. McDonald.
In the first of a rather unusual pair of decisions dealing with the
place of psychology in the courtroom,1 the court in People v. McDon-
ald2 was asked to decide whether the testimony of a psychologist
who is qualified as an expert on the various factors that may influ-
ence eyewitness identification is admissible in a criminal trial. In an-
swering in the affirmative,3 the court decided the time had come for
such scientific evidence to be presented to juries as an aid in reaching
proper verdicts. 4
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Largely on the strength of eyewitness identifications, defendant
McDonald was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of
another man in Long Beach. Four witnesses positively identified Mc-
Donald as the murderer, three others identified him tentatively and
one categorically testified that the defendant was not the murderer.
There was also conflicting testimony by others claiming that McDon-
ald was in fact near Mobile, Alabama the day of the shooting.
1. The sister case is People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1984), which deals with the use of hypnotically induced testimony in criminal
cases. Guerra is analyzed in this survey at 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 842 (1985).
2. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
with Bird, C.J., and Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso and Grodin, JJ., concurring.
3. 37 Cal. 3d at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
4. Id. Also noteworthy is the court's treatment of the secondary issue dealing
with the jury's failure to specify a degree in its conviction. Id. at 379-82, 690 P.2d at
728-31, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 255-58. The jury's failure brought into operation California
Penal Code section 1157. In another case decided this term, People v. Avalos, 37 Cal.
3d 216, 689 P.2d 121, 207 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1984), the court dealt with the issue in detail.
An analysis of the opinion appears in this survey at 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 820 (1985).
Prior to trial, defense counsel offered as a witness Dr. Robert
Shomer, a qualified expert in the psychology of eyewitness identifica-
tion. Dr. Shomer stated that he intended to inform the jury of psy-
chological factors that may influence the validity of an eyewitness
identification. The trial court refused to allow Dr. Shomer to testify,
based on its reading of People v. Johnson,5 as it felt that to admit Dr.
Shomer's testimony would usurp the jury's function of deciding is-
sues relative to the case.6
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The supreme court attacked the reasoning of the trial court
through an examination of the role psychological testimony would
play in a criminal trial. The court first noted that eyewitness identi-
fication is notorious for its inaccuracies. 7 History is full of instances
where mistaken identification has led to a miscarriage of justice,
leaving the suspect vulnerable to the powers of suggestion.S As the
court noted, distinguished federal jurists have called for caution in
the area.9 One judge has called for the courts to inform themselves
of scientific studies of eyewitness identification problems and "to al-
low juries access to that information in aid of their factfinding
tasks."10 Substantial study has been done in the area and "the courts
can no longer remain oblivious to their implications for the adminis-
tration of justice."1 1
In order to allow the jury to hear such information, the traditional
method of allowing the testimony of expert witnesses is called for.12
The judicial tradition, however, has been to disallow such testimony
when the subject is the psychological factors that affect the accuracy
of eyewitness identification.13 The court wondered whether the judi-
cial reluctance of admitting such testimony was justified. As the
leading case in the area, and the case relied upon by the trial court,
People v. Johnson proved to be an excellent point of departure for
the court's inquiry.
5. 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974).
6. 37 Cal. 3d at 362, 690 P.2d at 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
7. Id. at 363, 690 P.2d at 717, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)).
8. Id.
9. 37 Cal. 3d at 363-64, 690 P.2d at 717, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (citing Jackson v.
Fogg, 589 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1978) (Lumbard, J.)); United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361
(9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United
States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976) (McCree, J.)).
10. 37 Cal. 3d at 364, 690 P.2d at 717, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (citing United States v.
Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145-46 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring and
dissenting)).
11. 37 Cal. 3d at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
12. Id.
13. Id. (see cases cited therein).
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In Johnson, the court of appeal upheld the trial court's exclusion of
evidence pertaining to the psychology of identification on four
grounds.14 The supreme court found these grounds to be suspect.15
First, the Johnson court reasoned that while the Evidence Code sug-
gests the credibility of an eyewitness may be considered by a jury,16 it
did not follow that a party could call "another witness to testify as to
the former's capacity." 17 However, in McDonald, Dr. Shomer was
prepared only to educate the jury with the potential for improper
identification of a suspect due to various factors; his testimony was
not intended to directly attack the credibility of any particular
witness.1 8
Secondly, the Johnson court was concerned that section 801 of the
Evidence Code19 limited expert testimony to subjects "beyond the
range of common experience. ' 20 Section 801, however, applies only
to testimony coming from the opinion of the expert. 21 As to matters
of fact, the expert may testify if he qualifies as an expert2 2 and his
testimony would be relevant to the issues.2 3 Dr. Shomer's testimony
would have related primarily to facts and such facts were relevant to
the case.
Further, section 801 only limits expert testimony to matters "suffi-
ciently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert
would assist the trier of fact . . "24 The Johnson court flatly lim-
ited such testimony to matters "beyond common experience." 25 The
supreme court found this too limited a view.26 The McDonald court
preferred the test for admissibility of People v. Cole,27 which would
exclude expert testimony if it would add nothing to the jury's com-
mon everyday knowledge. 28 Applying this test in this case, it is obvi-
14. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
15. 37 Cal. 3d at 366, 690 P.2d at 719, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
16. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(c) (West 1966). This section permits the trier of
fact to consider a witness' ability to perceive, recollect and communicate in determin-
ing his credibility.
17. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 6, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
18. 37 Cal. 3d at 366, 690 P.2d at 719, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1966).
20. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1966).
22. CAL. EVID. CODE § 720 (West 1966).
23. "[AIll relevant evidence is admissible." CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1966).
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1966).
25. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 6, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
26. 37 Cal. 3d at 367, 690 P.2d at '720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47.
27. 47 Cal. 2d 99, 301 P.2d 854 (1956).
28. 37 Cal. 3d at 367, 690 P.2d at 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
ous that a jury could not be aware of the vagaries of eyewitness
identification. Many factors including time, lighting, personal feel-
ings, racial background, etc., might influence an identification and
the court concluded that, while jurors "might not be totally unaware"
of these factors, the information on such factors is "'sufficiently be-
yond common experience' that in appropriate cases expert opinion
thereon could at least 'assist the trier of fact.' "29
The third and fourth suggestions of the Johnson court were that, if
such testimony is admitted, it would be contrary to cases rejecting at-
tempts to impeach witnesses in non-sex offense cases, and would
otherwise invade the province of the jury.30 The McDonald court dis-
posed of these arguments rather summarily. As to the non-sex of-
fense cases, the court felt Johnson missed the point since, again, Dr.
Shomer did not intend to attack the credibility of any witness.31
With some disdain, the fourth suggestion was dispatched as the
empty rhetoric of an old cliche.3 2
Thus, the trial court's refusal to admit Dr. Shomer's testimony was
in error.33 The proclamation of such error, however, was not in-
tended to open the gates to a flood of expert evidence on eyewitness
identification, as the admission would remain a matter of the trial
court's discretion.34 But when eyewitness identification is a key to
the prosecution's case, and is not corroborated by evidence showing
its reliability, it would normally be error to exclude offered testi-
mony of the psychological factors affecting the accuracy of such
identifications.35
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Custodial rights of a natural father cannot be denied
unless placing the child in its father's custody would be
detrimental to the child: In re Baby Girl M.*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the extent of a natural father's parental rights after the
mother has relinquished their child for adoption? This was the ques-
tion before the California Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl M. The
29. Id. at 369, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 801(a) (West 1966)).
30. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
31. 37 Cal. 3d at 370, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
32. Id. That is, the fear that the testimony would "invade the province" or "usurp
the function" of a jury.
33. Id. at 371-72, 690 P.2d at 723, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
34. Id. at 373, 377, 690 P.2d at 725, 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251, 254.
35. Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
* Submitted by Emery J. Mishky, Law Review Staff Member.
1. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). Opinion by Sonenshine,
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court's majority held that where a natural father has not shirked his
obligation of support, and the mother has relinquished custodial
rights, the natural father's parental custodial rights may not be sev-
ered unless awarding custody to the natural father would be detri-
mental to the child.2 The dissenting justices adhered to the view that
the natural father should only receive custody when it is in the best
interests of the child.3
II. BACKGROUND
As a precursor to a discussion relating to the custody of children,
certain precepts must be established. There are two stages in the
process of the placement of minors. First, there must be a termina-
tion of the custodial rights of the person(s) having custody of the
child in question. Second, there must be an award of custodial rights
to the person(s) with whom the child is to be placed.
A number of the rules that govern the system of child custody are
clear. There are two ways in which a mother's custodial rights may
be severed. The mother may voluntarily consent to the termination
of her parental custodial rights4--as is the case when a mother gives
J., with Bird, C.J., Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., concurring. Separate dissent-
ing opinion by Mosk, J., with Kaus, J., concurring. Sonenshine, J., assigned by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The standard of "detriment to
the child" was borrowed from a California statute dealing with the custody of children
after dissolution proceedings.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a find-
ing that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and
the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
3. 37 Cal. 3d at 76, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
4. Unless otherwise indicated, custodial rights will be considered in the light of
the facts of the case of In re Baby Girl M. In this case, custodial rights were being
examined in the context of adoption proceedings.
California Civil Code section 7017 deals with the rights of mothers and fathers in
adoption proceedings.
(a)(1) If a mother relinquishes for or consents to or proposes to relinquish
for or consent to the adoption of a child who has (1) a presumed father ... or
(2) a father as to whom the child is a legitimate child under prior law of this
state or under the law of another jurisdiction, the father shall be given notice
of the adoption proceeding and have the rights provided under [the pertinent
civil code], unless the father's relationship to the child has been previously
terminated or determined by a court not to exist or the father has voluntarily
relinquished or consented to the adoption of such child.
(b) If a mother relinquishes for, consents to, or proposes to relinquish for or
consent to the adoption of a child who does not have (1) a presumed father
up her child for adoption. Alternatively, a mother's rights may be
severed if a court finds that it would be detrimental to the child to
remain with the mother.5
The role of the father in this scheme is more complicated. Fathers
can be classified into three distinct groups for purposes of determin-
ing custody. These groups are: (1) presumed fathers;6 (2) natural fa-
thers7 who have assumed support burdens for the child; and (3)
under [the pertinent civil code] or (2) a father as to whom the child is a legiti-
mate child under prior law of this state or under the law of another jurisdic-
tion, or if a child otherwise becomes the subject of an adoption proceeding and
the alleged father, if any, has not, in writing, denied paternity, waived his
right to notice, voluntarily relinquished or consented to the adoption, the
agency or person to whom the child has been or is to be relinquished, or the
mother or the person having custody of the child, shall file a petition in the
superior court to terminate the parental rights of the father, unless the fa-
ther's relationship to the child has been previously terminated or determined
not to exist by a court, or unless the father has been served as prescribed...
with a written notice alleging that he is or could be the natural father of the
child to be adopted or placed for adoption and has failed to bring an action for
the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child relationship
pursuant to [the pertinent civil code] within 30 days of service of such notice
or the birth of the child, whichever is later.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)-(b) (West 1983).
5. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975) (a
mother's lesbianism and criminal record provided sufficient support for the finding
that it would be detrimental for the child to remain with the mother).
6. A rebuttable presumption arises under the following circumstances:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the
conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of the
following subdivisions:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the
marriage is terminated ....
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have at-
tempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compli-
ance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the
child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its ter-
mination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is
born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married,
or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent com-
pliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared in-
valid, and
(i) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate, or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise
or by court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983) (part of the Uniform Parentage Act).
Evidence Code section 621 creates a conclusive presumption that "the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is ... a child of the mar-
riage" unless a blood test obtained within two years of the child's birth proves "that
the husband is not the father of the child." CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1985).
7. Natural fathers are biological fathers who are not presumed fathers.
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natural fathers who have not assumed support burdens. Presumed
fathers have parental rights in their children that are concurrent
with the mother's parental rights.8 Thus, a presumed father's paren-
tal custodial rights may only be terminated pursuant to his voluntary
consent,9 or upon a court finding that it would be detrimental to the
child to remain in his custody.10
In contrast, a natural father's parental rights are not concurrent
with the mother's parental rights.ii A natural father's parental
rights, if any, arise only after the mother has given up her parental
right to custody.12 A natural father who has not assumed parental
8. Section 197 of the California Civil Code provides in pertinent part:
The mother of an unmarried minor child is entitled to its custody, services
and earnings. The father of the child, if presumed to be the father under sub-
division (a) of Section 7004, is equally entitled to the custody, services and
earnings of the unmarried minor.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982).
9. If a father relinquishes or consents to or proposes to relinquish a child for
adoption, the mother shall be given notice of the adoption proceeding and
have the rights provided under [the pertinent civil code], unless the mother's
relationship to the child has been previously terminated by a court or the
mother has voluntarily relinquished or consented to the adoption of such
child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)(2) (West 1983).
10. See, e.g., In re Michele C., 64 Cal. App. 3d 818, 135 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1976) (father
was convicted of second degree murder of child's half-sister); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App.
3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976) (habeas corpus petition by unmarried father denied
after illegitimate child relinquished by mother and adopted by a family).
11. If, after the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satisfaction of
the court, or if more than one man is identified as a possible father, each shall
be given notice of the proceeding in accordance with subdivision (f), unless he
has been served with a written notice alleging that he is or could be the natu-
ral father of the child to be adopted, or placed or relinquished for adoption
and has failed to bring an action pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 7006 to
declare the existence of the father and child relationship within 30 days of
serving such notice or the birth of the child, whichever is later. If any of
them fails to appear or, if appearing, fails to claim custodial rights, his paren-
tal rights with reference to the child shall be terminated. If the natural father
or a man representing himself to be the natural father, claims custodial rights,
the court shall proceed to determine parentage and custodial rights in
whatever order the court deems proper. If the court finds that the man repre-
senting himself to be the natural father is a presumed father under subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 7004, then the court shall issue an order providing that the
father's consent shall be required for an adoption of the child. In all other
cases, the court shall issue an order providing that only the mother's consent
shall be required for the adoption of the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West 1983).
12. Once the mother has relinquished her rights, a natural father must be notified,
and his parental custodial rights must be determined before an adoption can proceed.
This determination is made at a section 7017 hearing, and is required before an adop-
tion can take place. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West 1983). See supra note 11 for the
text of section 7017(d).
duties does not gain parental rights to custody unless it is in the best
interests of the child.13 Additionally, he need not be given notice of
proceedings to place the child.14 Under the due process clause, he
has no constitutionally protected right to either notice of proceedings
to place his child, or the opportunity to be heard in such
proceedings.15
Prior to this case, the extent of the parental right to custody which
a natural father who assumed the duty of support had achieved was
unclear,16 i.e., what standard should be applied in denying this ac-
quired parental right. This was the precise question before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl M.17 The majority
determined that the natural father's right is so strong as to require a
"detriment to the child" standardl s in the case of a natural father
who had not shirked his burden of support for the child.19 This right
cannot be severed unless it would be detrimental to the child to have
custodial rights remain in the natural father. The dissent maintained
that the parental right to custody in the natural father was only as
strong as "the best interest of the child,"20 and thus the right to cus-
tody could be severed if it was merely in the best interests of the
child not to be in the custody of the natural father.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Baby Girl M. was born on July 18, 1981.21 After dating in the fall
of 1980, Edward, the natural father, and Baby Girl M.'s mother broke
up in November, without knowledge of the mother's pregnancy. 22
13. Such a father is treated as a nonparent, and is included in the pool of
norparents seeking custody. The standard in deciding between nonparents is the "best
interests of the child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West Supp. 1985).
14. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); see also Buchanan, The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313
(1984).
15. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
16. Although California Civil Code section 7017(d) provides for a hearing to deter-
mine the parental custody rights of the natural father, the standard by which this right
was to be determined was not indicated in the statute.
17. 37 Cal. 3d at 69, 688 P.2d at 921, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
18. Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
19. Although the court did not explicitly state that its holding applied only to nat-
ural fathers who had provided support, the court made clear that fathers who had
shirked their parental responsibilities did not have a protected parent-child relation-
ship. Fathers who shirked their responsibilities were not given notice or an opportu-
nity to be heard. Id. at 73-75, 688 P.2d at 923-25, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314-16. Further, in
its holding, the majority stressed the similarity between a natural father who
shouldered parental responsibility and a presumed father. "[B]oth classes of fathers
share the same burdens of support for the child .... Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207
Cal. Rptr. at 316 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 77, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
22. Id.
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During her hospital stay, the mother requested adoption assistance,
and after the birth placed the child in a foster home.23 She did not
inform Edward of the child's birth until August 1, 1981.24
On August 5, 1981, Edward met with a social worker. On ,that
same day, the mother formally relinquished the child for adoption.25
When Edward met with the social worker he requested that his new
daughter be placed with a family who was then providing day care
for his sons. 2 6 Edward did not express any desire for custody during
his visit with the social worker on August 10, 1981, and only later did
he make his first request for custody.27 It was unclear whether this
request for custody came before or after the child had been placed in
an adoptive home.28 On August 17, 1981, Edward specifically re-
quested custody of the child, and the child was placed with prospec-
tive adoptive parents of the mother's choice on August 24.29
On August 10, 1981, a petition to terminate Edward's parental
rights had been filed pursuant to section 1017 of the California Civil
Code.30 At the hearing on the petition, the court terminated Ed-
ward's parental custodial rights.3 1 The court determined that it was
23. At this time Edward still had no knowledge of the existence of his child. Id.
24. Id.
25. The mother wished the child placed with a family neither she nor Edward
knew. Id.
26. Id.
27. By this time the mother had already signed the consent for adoption, and thus
arguably relinquished her parental rights to custody. If so, at the same time the
mother relinquished custody, Edward's parental rights to custody commenced and Ed-
ward forfeited his right to custody by not asserting his right. Furthermore, under a
narrow interpretation of the relevant United States Supreme Court cases, Edward may
have fallen into a situation where he no longer possessed a protected parent-child in-
terest because he had declined to accept parental responsibility. See Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (father had no protected right because he had failed to strictly
comply with the state's putative father registry, and therefore no protected parent-
child relationship was formed); cf. Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (a natural
father was denied a legitimation petition when for eleven years he had only provided
sporadic support and did not live with the child).
28. 37 Cal. 3d at 76, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The majority, however,
was able to make a finding on the evidence as to the date the child was placed with
adoptive parents. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
29. This placement was contrary to Edward's wishes. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207
Cal. Rptr. at 311.
30. On this date Edward had not specifically requested custody, however he had
expressed fear that he would be unable to see the child. Id.
31. This was done despite the fact Edward was found to be "the biological father
and 'a good parent [who] can provide a good, loving home for this child.'" Id. (quoting
the Honorable Judith McConnell of the San Diego Superior Court).
in the child's best interests32 to remain with the adoptive parents.
The court made no finding that it would be detrimental to the child
to award custody to Edward.33
IV. OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion
Not only was this a case of first impression, there existed little au-
thority either in case law or from legislative sources to guide the
court. The majority was forced to rely on the "chronology" of the de-
velopments in the area of the law, and on pulling "narrow" rules
from broad statements of policy, despite the existence of extensive
statutes dealing with custodial rights.34
Section 4600 of the California Civil Code, enacted as part of the
Family Law Act, commands that in a dissolution proceeding the
awarding of a child to nonparents can only be accomplished with the
parents' consent, or if awarding the child to a parent would be detri-
mental to the child.35 As between persons with equal rights (e.g., be-
tween parents, or between nonparents), custody of children is
awarded according to the best interests of the child.36 The court
looked to the case of In re B.., 7 in which, after the legislative his-
tory of section 4600 was analyzed, it was concluded that as between
32. By using the "best interests" standard, Edward was grouped with nonparents.
He had no parental preference to custody of the child.
33. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
34. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4600-4608 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
35. See supra note 2.
36. (b) Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference ac-
cording to the best interests of the child pursuant to section 4608:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to either parent. In
making an order for custody to either parent, the court shall consider, among
other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child or children fre-
quent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and shall not pre-
fer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
The court, in its discretion, may require the parents to submit to the court a
plan for the implementation of the custody order.
(2) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in whose home the child
has been living in a wholesome and stable environment.
(3) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and
able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West Supp. 1985).
Before enactment of this section, in contested custody proceedings, a mother, by vir-
tue of her gender, obtained a preference for custody. For criticism of this system, see
Comment, Custody Rights Of Unwed Fathers, 4 PAc. L.J. 922 (1973).
The application of the "best interests of the child" standard is left to the broad dis-
cretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Russo I, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 86, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 511 (1971); see also Sanchez v. Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d 118, 121, 358 P.2d 533, 535,
10 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1961) (no abuse if record contains substantial evidence in sup-
port of custody award). However, decision on the custody issue is limited to this stan-
dard, and other factors cannot be determinative. In re Marriage of Stoker, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 878, 135 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1977).
37. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
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parents and nonparents, parents would be preferred.38 This led the
court to the conclusion that Edward, a parent, should be preferred to
other persons. Preference could be achieved by applying a different
standard to Edward. A standard for custody that would give Edward
custody only if it was in the best interests of the child would equalize
his status with that of nonparents. However, the "detriment to the
child" standard would elevate him to a preferred status over
nonparents.39
The majority also relied on inferences drawn from legislative ac-
tions. A bill that was vetoed by the governor,40 and then reintro-
duced, declared that section 4600's parental preference would not
apply to a natural father.41 However, the court held that this portion
of the bill was never considered by the Assembly Judiciary Commit-
tee because the provision was only amended into the bill after it left
the committee.42 Further, the court pointed out that the bill passed
the Senate Judiciary Committee after being heard the same day
eighty other bills were on the calendar.43 An interim hearing on the
bill before the Select Committee on Children and Youth produced a
consensus among the witnesses that the rights of alleged fathers
were important and should be protected.44 Finally, the author of the
bill agreed to eliminate the portion denying alleged fathers section
4600 protection.
The court also noted that in enacting section 7017 of the Civil Code,
the legislature was aware of court decisions extending the section
4600 standards. Yet the legislature failed to avail itself of opportuni-
ties to keep section 4600 from influencing section 7017.45
38. Id. at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
39. This standard, taken from California Civil Code section 4600, was also applied
at the appellate court level in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 218, 221,
205 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369 (1984) ("necessary to avert harm to the child"). Contra W.E.J.
v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867 (1979) (use of detri-
ment standard would go against legislative intent by giving the natural father veto
powers over adoptions); Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 629, 145 Cal. Rptr.
122, 125 (1978) (only a presumed father has a statutory right to object to an adoption
sought by the natural mother).
40. 37 Cal. 3d at 71, 688 P.2d at 922, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
41. A.B. No. 1782, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 2-6 (as amended in Senate, January 17, 1984).
42. 37 Cal. 3d at 71, 688 P.2d at 922, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313. The portion of the bill
pertaining to the order of preference of an alleged natural father seeking custody was
amended out of the bill on February 23, 1984. A.B. No. 1782, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 2-6 (as
amended in Senate, February 23, 1984).
43. 37 Cal. 3d at 71, 688 P.2d at 922, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (quoting and interpreting
report on A.B. No. 1782 to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
44. Id.
45. Id.
From these indistinct indications, the majority divined the legisla-
tive intent that a natural father's parental custodial rights cannot be
terminated except upon a showing of detriment to the child.46
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the interests of
unwed fathers offered little aid in the determination of the case.
Supreme Court cases in this sphere addressed situations in which fa-
thers assumed responsibility for their children to an extent that
would have qualified them as presumed fathers in California,47 or at
the other extreme, failed to assume parental responsibilities alto-
gether.4 8 No Supreme Court authority dealt with the rights of a fa-
ther who did not qualify as a presumed father and yet had not
shirked his responsibilities as a parent. This predescribed situation
was posed in Edward's case by the fact that Edward was kept in igno-
rance of the child's existence. After reviewing United States
Supreme Court cases, the majority merely noted that the California
custody scheme fell within constitutional bounds of due process by
giving adequate rights to notice.49
B. Dissenting Opinion
The crux of the dissent's disagreement with the majority's legal
analysis lay in the perceived neglect of statutory language. The dis-
sent pointed to the fact that the legislature had established a sharp
rift between presumed fathers on the one hand and natural fathers
on the other.5 0 By employing the same standard for the natural fa-
ther as that used for a presumed father, the majority erased any dis-
tinction between the two. Further, it was maintained that by using
the detriment to the child test to sever the natural father's parental
custodial rights, the natural father had been granted a veto power
over adoption proceedings that was never envisioned by the legisla-
46. Id. at 72, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314. In a previous case at the appel-
late court level, it was implied that the use of a detriment standard would be tanta-
mount to a veto. W.E.J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 369. However, the
supreme court found that because a natural father did not possess any rights until the
mother relinquished custody of the child, there was no veto power over adoption pro-
ceedings as contemplated by the W.E.J. court. 37 Cal. 3d at 72-73, 688 P.2d at 923, 207
Cal. Rptr. at 314.
47. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
48. See Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). For a closer case, where a father
had merely failed to strictly comply with putative father legislative laws, see Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
49. The majority pointed out that its holding was not based on a lack of federal
due process. The court did feel it important, however, to note a law review article
which discussed the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, Buchanan, supra note 14.
37 Cal. 3d at 74, 688 P.2d at 924-25, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 77-78, 688 P.2d at 926-27, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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ture.5 1 The dissent also criticized the inferences the majority drew
from indistinct indicators of legislative policy.52
Upon examination of the majority's evaluation of United States
Supreme Court decisions, Justice Mosk pointed out that the Supreme
Court cases require no more than the notification of a natural father
who has assumed parental responsibilities before his rights are termi-
nated.53 The United States Supreme Court cases were seen as differ-
entiating between developed relationships-which were closely
protected-as contrasted with cases in which the father had not de-
veloped a relationship-which were not protected.
Justice Mosk seemed sufficiently concerned with Baby Girl M.'s
specific case to devote a significant portion of his dissent to delineat-
ing the course of the trial court upon remand.54 By marshalling forth
strong language and authority dealing with the problem of child
placement,55 Justice Mosk attempted to supply future courts with
weighty ammunition with which to handle the detriment standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority relied on a two point foundation for its ruling. It re-
lied on broad statements of policy on the status of parents in case
law, and indistinct indicators of legislative intent. Discussion of
United States Supreme Court cases was merely used as an opportu-
nity to furnish dicta on the issue of notice to an unwed father. From
its analysis, the majority was able to construct a statutory scheme
51. Id. at 78, 688 P.2d at 927, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 318 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. This, however, did not keep the dissent from employing similar tactics. Draw-
ing inferences from indistinct legislative indicators, the dissent concluded that it was
not the legislative intent to use the detriment standard in the case of natural fathers.
Id. at 79-80, 688 P.2d at 927-28, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 81, 688 P.2d at 929, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (looking at
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)). However, this was the same proposition put
forth by the majority. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. 37 Cal. 3d at 83-84, 688 P.2d at 930-31, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). The dissent noted that the situation after trial is different than that before
trial, and that even if it may not have been detrimental to the child to give custody to
Edward in August of 1981, the child had now lived almost all of its young life with its
adoptive parents and thus it may have become detrimental to the child to give custody
to Edward. Id.
55. The dissent focused on cases which gave a determinative effect to the removal
of a child from a settled home in adoption proceedings. In re Volkland, 74 Cal. App. 3d
674, 141 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1977); In re Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 117
Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975); Williams v. Neumann, 405 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); In re
Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973). See also Connolly v. Con-
nolly, 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1963) (custody of young child should not
be changed unless there are compelling reasons).
governing the rights of natural fathers. Within this scheme, after a
mother has relinquished custody rights to her child, a natural father
who has not shirked his child support duties cannot be denied the
custody of his child without a finding that it would be to the child's
detriment to remain with the natural father.56
The dissent justifiably attacked the majority's reliance on indistinct
indicators of legislative policy. However, the foundation of the dis-
sent was based upon the majority's erasure of the differentiation be-
tween a presumed father and a natural father. The dissent
maintained that this was contrary to legislative intent. However, the
majority's ruling does not erase all distinction between a presumed
father and a natural father. A presumed father has concurrent rights
of custody with the mother. Initially, a natural father has no rights
to custody. Only when the mother has relinquished her right to cus-
tody does a natural father's right to custody arise.57 The blunt argu-
ment that the majority's decision is incorrect because it removes
differentiation between the two types of fathers is untenable. That
there is a differentiation is clear. The question is: to what extent are
presumed fathers differentiated from natural fathers? Besides the
concept of concurrent custodial rights, did the legislature also intend
to provide for different standards of custody as between the two clas-
sifications of fathers? Other than maintaining the argument that by
adopting the majority's point of view all distinction is erased between
the two classes of fathers, the dissent does little to address this point.
Justice Mosk did attempt to draw inferences from indistinct legisla-
tive indicators in support of the best interest of the child standard,
the same method which was condemned in analyzing the majority's
reasoning.
Finally, the dissent erroneously attacked the majority's reliance on
United States Supreme Court cases. The dissent maintained that the
majority's conclusion could not be supported by the cited Supreme
Court cases, and that the cases merely gave direction on giving notice
to natural fathers. However, this was not the proposition the major-
ity was putting forth. The majority was merely advancing the propo-
sition that the California scheme of custody relating to natural
fathers was within the notice requirements of due process, not that
the United States Supreme Court cases established the standard to be
employed in determining the natural father's parental custodial
rights.
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent rests on solid founda-
tions. However, upon examination of case law and legislative
sources, it becomes easy to see why this is so. In addition to little
56. 37 Cal. 3d at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)-(b) (West 1983) (text appears supra note 4).
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case law on the subject, the difficulty in analysis is exacerbated by
the lack of specific legislative attention to the situation. The statutes
that have been promulgated add confusion because of inconsisten-
cies.5 8 With such little precedent and authority, the court's decision
could only be founded on the most basic concepts.
The majority view of the natural father is one in which he is co-
equal with the mother in the desire, or knowledge, of the conception
of their child.59 Parents' actions after the birth of their child are
deemed important, especially the willingness to assume parental re-
sponsibility. The dissent viewed the natural father as a hostile stran-
ger with no bonds to his child.60 He is merely a stranger who is given
a right to have significant control over the lives of people with whom
he has no real connection. In such a basic metaphysical divergence of
views, both views are valid. Therefore, the "correct" view is that of
the majority of the people. Thus the legislature, the elected repre-
sentatives of the people, should be the proper body to decide the
question. However, until this happens, the rule is: after a mother
has relinquished custodial rights, a natural father who has not
shirked his parental responsibilities cannot be deprived of the cus-
tody of his child unless it is determined that it is detrimental to the
child to remain in his custody.61
58. For example, one of the primary purposes of the Uniform Parentage Act, en-
acted in 1976, was to eliminate distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). To accomplish this goal,
the parent-child relationship is deemed to extend "equally to every child and to every
parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West
1983). But in apparent contradiction to this principle is the language of the statute.
For example, in section 7017 it is stated that in the case of a presumed father, his con-
sent is needed before adoption. On the other hand, if there is no presumed father,
"only the mother's consent shall be required for the adoption of the child." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7017(d) (West 1983).
59. The actions of both parents after the birth of their child determine their
ability to accept parental responsibility. An unwed mother may have had no
more desire to conceive or knowledge of the conception than the unwed fa-
ther .... Her decision to release the child for adoption should not deprive
the father of a meaningful opportunity to retain and develop his relationship.
37 Cal. 3d at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
60. The result [of the majority decision] is to grant to a biological father, who
may have had a single night's liaison with a stranger, who may not have
known about the child's birth until long after it occurred, and who may not
have ever seen the child, the very same custodial rights [as a presumed father
in a section 7017 proceeding].
Id. at 76-77, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
B. Couple's reconciliation cancels child custody order
contained in interlocutory judgment of dissolution:
People v. Howard.
In People v. Howard, 36 Cal. 3d 852, 686 P.2d 644, 206 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1984), the supreme court ruled on the effect of a reconciliation by
husband and wife upon a child custody provision contained in an in-
terlocutory judgment of dissolution.
The defendant and his wife obtained an interlocutory decree of dis-
solution which contained child custody and visitation provisions.
Prior to the final judgment, the parties reconciled, then separated
two years later, at which time the wife obtained a final judgment of
dissolution. Shortly thereafter, the defendant took the children and
refused to return them to his ex-wife. He was subsequently arrested,
charged, and convicted of child stealing pursuant to Penal Code sec-
tion 278.5.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the reconciliation invali-
dated the interlocutory judgment, therefore he had not taken the
children "in violation of a custody order" as required by section 278.5.
The supreme court, in determining whether a valid custody order
existed at the time the defendant took the children, looked to the
case of In re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal. 3d 897, 663 P.2d 187, 191
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1983), which held that reconciliation cancels an inter-
locutory decree. To establish that a reconciliation actually occurred,
clear and cogent proof that the spouses mutually intended to perma-
nently unite, thereby restoring each party's marital rights, is
necessary.
Inasmuch as the testimony of the parties established a mutual in-
tent to resume the marital relationship on a permanent basis, the de-
cree containing the child custody order was cancelled. Thus, the
defendant's conviction was reversed because he did not violate an ex-
isting child custody order.
Chief Justice Bird, in her concurring opinion, addressed the de-
fendant's argument that his good faith belief that a reconciliation had
nullified the interlocutory judgment constituted a defense to the sec-
tion 278.5 violation. The Chief Justice believed that section 278.5 re-
quired a specific intent to deprive the other parent of custody or
visitation. Thus, according to the Chief Justice, since a good faith but
mistaken belief is a defense to specific intent crimes, if the accused
has a good faith but mistaken belief that a child custody order has
been nullified by a reconciliation, he does not have the specific intent
to deprive the legal custodian of custody.
[Vol. 12: 789, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IX. GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY
Public entities have a duty to exercise due care to protect
and to warn the public against the reasonably foreseeable
tortious conduct of third parties on public property:
Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A split has existed between the California appellate courts as to
the liability of public entities to persons injured by the intentional
acts of third parties while on public property.' Some courts have held
that public entities have a duty to protect users of public property
against any risk, including the intentional torts of third parties,
where the conditions of the public property make such risks reason-
ably foreseeable.2 Other courts have held that the intentional torts
of third parties are not a risk which the legislature intended public
entities to be liable for, and have held public entities to be immune
from liability for such acts.3 The supreme court in Peterson v. San
Francisco Community College District4 rejected the latter appellate
view and held that a public entity owes a duty of care to members of
the public whom it invites to use public property.5 The court found
that this duty extended to warning the public about reasonably fore-
seeable criminal conduct by third parties, 6 and taking measures to
correct conditions of public property which encourage such criminal
conduct. 7
* Article submitted by Paul Bauducco, Law Review Staff Member.
1. Cf. Slapin v. Los Angeles Int'l Airport, 65 Cal. App. 3d 484, 490, 135 Cal. Rptr.
296, 299 (1977) (poor lighting in parking structure constituted a dangerous condition),
with Sykes v. County of Marin, 43 Cal. App. 3d 158, 117 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1974) (poor
lighting not a dangerous condition).
2. Slapin, 65 Cal. App. 3d 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 296 (second district decision holding
that a public entity may be liable for failing to properly light a public parking lot
where such conditions create an opportunity for criminal third party acts).
3. Sykes, 43 Cal. App. 3d 158, 117 Cal. Rptr. 466 (first district decision finding no
legislative intent to include third party criminal acts within the definition of dangerous
conditions of public property).
4. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984). Opinion by Broussard,
J., with Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso, and Grodin, JJ., and Smith (P.A.), J., concurring. Bird,
C.J., concurred in the judgment. Smith (P.A.), J., assigned by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council.
5. Id. at 814, 685 P.2d at 1201-02, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
6. Id. at 815, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
7. Id.
II. FACTS
In Peterson, the plaintiff sued the San Francisco Community Col-
lege District for injuries she received as the result of an attempted
rape which occurred in a campus parking lot. The plaintiff was at-
tacked as she ascended a stairway leading to the parking lot. Her as-
sailant used thick foliage adjacent to the stairway to conceal himself,
attacking the plaintiff as she walked by. The attacker's modus oper-
andi was similar to that of previous assaults which had occuired at
the same location.8
The Community College District knew of these prior attacks and
had taken measures to protect students using the stairway. The
plaintiff was a student at the college and had purchased a parking
permit for the area in which she was attacked.9
The trial court found that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a
cause of action under the Tort Claims Act and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the First District affirmed the
dismissal,' 0 holding that the college had no duty to warn the plaintiff
of possible criminal attack and that the criminal acts of third parties
were not reasonably foreseeable occurrences protected against under
the Tort Claims Act."
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
In 1963, the California legislature passed what has become known
as the Tort Claims Act.12 The Act set out a comprehensive legisla-
tive scheme of governmental tort liability.13 The tort liability of pub-
lic entities was limited to that specifically set out in the Act.14
Liability of public entities for dangerous conditions of public prop-
8. Id. at 805, 685 P.2d at 1195, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
9. Id.
10. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 141 Cal. App. 3d 456, 190
Cal. Rptr. 335 (1983).
11. Id. at 462-63, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
12. 1963 Cal. Stat. 3266 (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-895.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984))
(dealing with substantive liabilities and employees); 1963 Cal. Stat. 3369 (CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 900-978.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984)) (dealing with procedural provisions con-
cerning public utilities and public employees). The statutes have no official short title
but have come to be known as the 1963 Tort Claims Act.
13. Id. See A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY PRAC-
TICE 25 (1980) for an exhaustive study of the legislative and case history of the Califor-
nia Tort Claims Act.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980). Section 815 provides that "except as pro-
vided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person." See also the accompanying Legislative Committee Comment-Senate, which
states that "the practical effect of this section is to eliminate any common law liability
for damages arising out of torts." Id.
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erty is defined by Government Code sections 83015 and 835.16 The
two sections generally limit public entity liability for dangerous con-
ditions of public property to those injuries which: (1) are proximately
caused by a dangerous condition of public property; and (2) occur af-
ter the public entity or agency responsible for the property has had
actual notice and adequate time to correct the defect.17
Initially, public entities were held not to be liable for injuries
caused by third party criminal acts on public property. 18 In Hayes v.
State, the California Supreme Court found no governmental liability
for injuries resulting from an attack which occurred upon a state-
owned beach. In making its decision, the court found that the inju-
ries were not caused by any condition of the property, but solely by
the actions of third party assailants.19 However, the court did recog-
nize the possibility that a "combination of defect in the property and
acts of third parties" could create liability under section 835.20
Following the Hayes decision, a split developed between the appel-
late courts upon the issue of whether criminal third party acts were a
15. As used in this chapter:
(a) "Dangerous condition" means a condition of property that creates a sub-
stantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury
when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.
(b) "Protect against" includes repairing, remedying or correcting a dangerous
condition, providing safeguards against a dangerous condition, or warning of a
dangerous condition.
(c) "Property of a public entity" and "public property" mean real or personal
property owned or controlled by the public entity, but do not include ease-
ments, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of
the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830 (West 1980).
16. Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by
a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the prop-
erty was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury
was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condi-
tion created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was in-
curred, and that either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public
entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980).
17. Id.
18. Hayes v. State, 11 Cal. 3d 469, 521 P.2d 855, 113 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1974) (suit on
behalf of two men, attacked by unknown assailants while sleeping on a state-owned
beach).
19. Id. at 472, 521 P.2d at 857, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 601. The court found the beach to
be unimproved property which did not contribute to the attacks.
20. Id.
"dangerous condition" within the meaning of section 835. The con-
flicting appellate approaches are best illustrated by Sykes v. County
of Marin21 and Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport.22
In Sykes, the Court of Appeal for the First District held that the
intentional acts of third parties were not within the "dangerous con-
dition" definition of section 835. The plaintiff had been attacked and
robbed in an unlit school parking lot. The court found no liability for
a dangerous condition of public property, stating that:
In the instant case the harm was caused not by the condition of the parking
lot but by the criminal acts of third parties. The fact that the parking area
was not lighted is not the kind of dangerous condition contemplated by the
Legislature in its legislation concerning defective dangerous conditions of pub-
lic property. Nor is the legislation designed to protect against activities of
third persons on public property who disregard the law.
2 3
In reaching its conclusion, the Sykes court interpreted the legisla-
ture's intent in passing sections 830 and 835 as that of limiting public
entity liability.24 The Sykes court also read the proximate cause por-
tion of section 835 narrowly, excluding liability for injuries not di-
rectly caused by a condition of public property. 25
In Slapin, the Court of Appeal for the Second District held that
public entities were liable for the criminal acts of third parties where
conditions of public property created a substantial risk of such acts.
Slapin involved facts similar to Sykes, the plaintiff being attacked in
a dimly lit airport parking lot. The Slapin court based its decision of
liability upon two principles:
(1) A governmental entity may be liable for injuries caused by a combination
of a dangerous condition of public property and the wrongful acts of third par-
ties . . . and
(2) a defendant may not successfully defend that the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by the wrongful criminal act of a third party, where the very basis
upon which the defendant is claimed to be negligent is that the defendant cre-
ated a reasonably foreseeable risk of such third party conduct.
2 6
In stating the first principle, the court cited the decisions in Hayes
and Baldwin v. State of California.2 7 In Baldwin, the supreme court
found that a defect in a highway combined with a third party's negli-
gence produced the plaintiff's injury and subjected the defendant
public entity to liability under section 835.28 Slapin extended this lia-
21. 43 Cal. App. 3d 158, 117 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1974).
22. 65 Cal. App. 3d 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1977).
23. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 164, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
24. Id. By holding that the legislative intent was to exclude the criminal acts of
third parties from the definitions of dangerous conditions of public property, the court
foreclosed any future judicial expansion of liability under sections 830 and 835 to in-
clude such acts.
25. Id.
26. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
27. 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1972).
28. Id.
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bility to injuries resulting from a combination of property defects and
criminal acts of third parties.
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Peterson, the supreme court adopted the position of the Slapin
court, holding that public entities may be liable for injuries caused by
a criminal agency when conditions of public property made such
criminal conduct reasonably foreseeable.
The supreme court found that a public entity owes a special duty of
care to members of the public which it "invites" to enter public prop-
erty.29 This "special relationship" was created in the present case by
the defendant college district's acceptance of tuition and a parking
fee from the plaintiff.30
The creation of this relationship imposes an affirmative duty upon
the public entity to take reasonable steps to protect its invitees from
risks which are reasonably foreseeable. 3 1 This duty includes the obli-
gation to warn invitees of reasonably foreseeable criminal acts by
third parties and to correct conditions of public property which con-
tribute to such acts.
In requiring public entities to warn of foreseeable criminal acts, the
court distinguished the Hayes case, which found such warnings harm-
ful to the public interest.3 2 In the present case, the court found that
public warnings would not deter use of public property, but would
alert public invitees to the foreseeable risks of such use.33
Furthermore, the court found that Government Code section 845,
which grants immunity for failure to provide adequate police protec-
tion, does not immunize public entities against a failure to warn of
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts.3 4 Consequently, the court held
that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant is liable for failure to
warn the plaintiff of earlier attacks stated a cause of action.3 5
The supreme court held that the Tort Claims Act did create liabil-
ity for criminal acts occurring on public property.3 6 The court read
sections 835 and 830 broadly in finding a duty to correct conditions of
29. 36 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 685 P.2d at 1195-96, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
30. Id. at 805-06, 685 P.2d at 1196-97, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
31. Id. at 810-11, 685 P.2d at 1199-1200, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
32. Id, at 813-14, 685 P.2d at 1201, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 814-15, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 815, 685 P.2d at 1202-03, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
public property which contribute to the risks of criminal acts upon
such property. The court stated: "Nothing in the provisions of sec-
tion 835 . . . specifically precludes a finding that a public entity may
be under a duty, given special circumstances, to protect against harm-
ful criminal conduct on its property."3 7
The court noted that the defendant college district had actual no-
tice of the criminal assaults in this case and that, in similar circum-
stances, a private party would be liable for injuries caused by such
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts upon its property. 38 It cited
Slapin in finding that criminal acts were not intervening causes re-
lieving public entities from liability for injuries where a condition of
public property contributed to the risk that such acts would occur.3 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Peterson decision establishes public entity liability for a failure
to warn public invitees of reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct
upon public property where the condition of the property contributes
to such conduct.40 ' Furthermore, the decision ends the conflict be-
tween California appellate courts regarding the application of Gov-
ernment Code section 835 liability to injuries caused by criminal acts
upon public property.41 The decision places additional duties upon
public entities to ensure that conditions of public property do not
contribute to criminal acts. It will increase public expenditures for
improvements upon public property and payment of judgments re-
sulting from increased public entity liability.
X. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Putative spouse entitled to share of decedent's separate
property: Estate of Leslie.
In Estate of Leslie,1 the supreme court was asked to decide whether
a putative spouse would be entitled to a share of the separate prop-
erty of a decedent who died intestate. In deciding in the affirmative,
the court noted that cases have consistently afforded a surviving pu-
tative spouse the same rights as a surviving legal spouse.2
Fay Leslie and William Garvin married in Tijuana, Mexico in 1972.
The marriage was invalid under Mexican law as it was never re-
37. Id. at 811, 685 P.2d at 1199, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
38. Id. at 809, 685 P.2d at 1198-99, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
39. Id. at 812, 685 P.2d at 1200, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
40. Id. at 815, 685 P.2d at 1202-03, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
41. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
1. 37 Cal. 3d 186, 689 P.2d 133, 207 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1984). Opinion by Bird, C.J.,
expressing the unanimous view of the court.
2. Id. at 203, 689 P.2d at 144, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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corded. 3 Leslie and Garvin lived together as husband and wife for
approximately nine years, until Leslie died intestate in 1981. At her
death, petitions for letters of administration were filed by Leslie's
son from a prior marriage and, in opposition, by Garvin. At trial, the
court held the marriage between Leslie and Garvin to be putative,
denied Garvin's letters of administration, and held he was not enti-
tled to succeed to any portion of Leslie's separate property.4 Garvin
appealed, contending he was entitled to an intestate share of the de-
cedent's separate property, and that he should have been appointed
administrator of the estate.5 The principal issue was whether a puta-
tive spouse is entitled to a share of a decedent's separate property.
6
The court began its decision by drawing guidance from decisions
which had awarded a putative spouse a share of quasi-marital prop-
erty.7 In Feig v. Bank of America,8 the decedent had obtained a di-
vorce from the surviving spouse a year after marriage, but had
continued to live with the spouse as husband and wife. In 1921, dece-
dent remarried the spouse and later died intestate. 9 The court held
in Feig that although the property acquired by the Feigs during the
period in which they were divorced was not community property, the
property should be marked by all the incidents of marriage.'0 There-
fore, Mr. Feig was allowed to inherit all the property." The Feig de-
cision was extended in Estate of Krone,12 where the court of appeal
held that when a putative spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse
takes the same share to which that spouse would have been entitled
had the marriage been valid.13 This share of the quasi-marital prop-
3. Id. at 190-91, 689 P.2d at 135, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 563. Since the marriage was in-
valid in Mexico it was also invalid in California. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1983).
4. 37 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 689 P.2d at 136, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
5. id.
6. Id. The case was one of first impression for the court. A "putative" spouse is
one who believes in good faith that the marriage was valid when in fact it is not valid.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West 1983). The parties in Leslie did not dispute the trial
court's finding of a putative marriage. 37 Cal. 3d at 191 n.4, 689 P.2d at 136 n.4, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 564 n.4.
7. 37 Cal. 3d at 192, 689 P.2d at 137, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Quasi-marital property
is property acquired during the putative marriage which would have been community
or quasi-community property if acquired in the course of a valid marriage. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4452 (West 1983); Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 717, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779,
780 (1974).
8. 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936).
9. Id. at 270, 54 P.2d at 5.
10. Id. at 273, 54 P.2d at 7.
11. Id. at 273-74, 54 P.2d at 7.
12. 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
13. Id. at 769, 189 P.2d at 742-43.
erty would amount to all the inheritable property. 14 As the court
reasoned, "it would. . . be contrary to established law to deny to this
putative wife her rights as a surviving spouse to inherit the total of
the gains of the putative marriage." 15
As the court in Leslie noted, Krone has been read by other courts
"'to recognize a putative [spouse] as a legal spouse for the purpose of
succession.' "16 Examples of the application of this recognition were
cited by the Leslie court. These were Estate of Goldberg, 17 Garrado v.
Collins, 1 8 and Estate of Shank. 19
In Estate of Goldberg, the court of appeal affirmed a trial court's
award of all community property and one-third of decedent's sepa-
rate property to a putative spouse.20 The holding was based on a
finding that Edith Goldberg was entitled to the same share of the
quasi-marital or "community" property as any legal spouse would
be.21 In Garrado, the court of appeal dismissed an appeal which con-
tended that the trial court erred by granting a putative husband one-
third of decedent's separate property.22 The appeal was dismissed
based on the appellants' lack of standing as aggrieved parties.23 In
dictum, however, the court of appeal stated that even if the appel-
lants did have standing, their claim to the putative husband's one-
third might fail anyway, as Estate of Krone might allow the putative
spouse to inherit as if a legal spouse.24 Finally, in Estate of Shank,25
14. Id. at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743. California Probate Code section 201 provided
that upon "death of either husband or wife, one-half of the community property be-
longs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition
of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the surviving spouse .... CAL.
PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956) (repealed as of Jan. 1, 1985, see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 100,
6101, 6401(a) (West Supp. 1984) for current provisions). The court in Krone reasoned
that parity compels the conclusion that if the statute entitles the survivor of a valid
marriage to take all of the community estate, then, as a putative spouse takes to the
same degree as a valid spouse, a putative spouse ought to be entitled to all the prop-
erty. 82 Cal. App. 2d at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743. The Leslie court agreed with such rea-
soning. 37 Cal. 3d at 193, 689 P.2d at 137-38, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66.
15. Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d at 770, 189 P.2d at 743.
16. 37 Cal. 3d at 194, 689 P.2d at 138, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (quoting Kunakoff v.
Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 65-66, 332 P.2d 773, 777 (1958)).
17. 203 Cal. App. 2d 402, 21 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1962).
18. 136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 288 P.2d 620 (1955).
19. 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (1957).
20. 203 Cal. App. 2d at 412, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 632. The court was actually silent as to
the trial court's award of separate property, stating merely that Edith Goldberg, as a
putative spouse, was "entitled to the same share of the 'community' property as she
would receive as an actual wife." Id. The Leslie court took this silence as an acquies-
cence to the proposition that putative spouses are legal spouses for purposes of succes-
sion, especially since the Goldberg court cited Krone in support of that proposition.
21. Id.
22. Garrado v. Collins, 136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 326, 288 P.2d 620, 622 (1955).
23. Id. at 325-26, 288 P.2d at 621-22.
24. Id.
25. 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 810, 316 P.2d 710, 711 (1957).
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decedent had obtained a Mexican divorce from her legal husband,
which was invalid, and married her putative husband. Her legal hus-
band acquiesced and relied upon the Mexican divorce, which es-
topped him from asserting that she was the surviving spouse for the
purpose of inheriting decedent's separate property.26 The surviving
putative spouse was awarded one-half of decedent's separate property
and surviving siblings were awarded proportionate shares of the re-
maining half.27 As the Leslie court noted, while Shank was decided
on estoppel principles, it was another example of a putative spouse
"permitted to succeed to a share of the decedent's separate
property."28
In addition to the cases mentioned above, the court noted that, in
other analogous contexts, the courts had granted surviving putative
spouses the same rights as legal spouses.29 Putative spouses have
been allowed to bring actions for wrongful death,30 and have been
held to be a surviving spouse within California Government Code
section 21364.31 In addition, putative spouses have been held to be
"surviving widow[s]" under former Labor Code section 4702, and
have been awarded spousal benefits under the federal civil service re-
tirement statute.3 2
One case, Estate of Levie,33 a court of appeal decision, was contrary
to the proposition that putative spouses are entitled to a share of de-
cedent's separate property. Levie gave three reasons for denying a
putative spouse the right to succeed to separate property. It con-
cluded that there were no California decisions compelling such a re-
sult, the equities of quasi-marital property do not apply to separate
property since joint efforts are not required for the acquisition of sep-
arate property, and third, to give a share of separate property would
do violence to the statutory scheme of intestate succession to separate
26. Id. at 811-12, 316 P.2d at 712. Subsequent to the Mexican divorce, the legal
husband bought property "as a single man," and lived with another woman. Id. at 811,
316 P.2d at 712.
27. Id. at 812, 316 P.2d at 712. The siblings were estopped from denying the valid-
ity of the Mexican divorce as well. Since decedent had relied on the divorce, she
would have been estopped to deny the validity of the divorce, and her siblings, being in
privity with decedent, also could not deny its validity. Id.
28. 37 Cal. 3d at 195, 689 P.2d at 139, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
29. Id. at 195-96, 689 P.2d at 139, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
30. Id. (and authorities cited therein).
31. Id. at 196, 689 P.2d at 139, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
32. Id. at 196, 689 P.2d at 139-40, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68.
33. 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975).
property.3 4 The Leslie court rejected Levie, citing criticism by com-
mentators of the Levie decision.35
The Leslie court reasoned that the foregoing cases clearly pointed
to one conclusion: "a surviving putative spouse is entitled to succeed
to a share of his or her decedent's separate property."36 This result,
it felt, was "inherently fair."37
Perhaps in the final analysis it was the fairness of the result which
compelled the conclusion. It is cautioned that Leslie be given careful
application, avoiding the opposite set of facts wherein the survivor
knows of the invalidity of the marriage.
XI. LABOR RELATIONS
Regulation requiring employer to give list of employees to
labor organization upheld; not necessary to prove both
intent and effect in charging employer with interfering
with employees' rights: Carian v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board.
In Carian v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 36 Cal. 3d 654,
685 P.2d 701, 205 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1984), the supreme court was asked
to determine whether the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(ALRB) was within its authority in promulgating regulations requir-
ing employers to furnish employee lists upon certain notice, and what
showing was required to establish a violation of a statute prohibiting
interference with employee rights.
The employers were found guilty of having violated a regulation
made by the ALRB which required them to supply "prepetition em-
ployee lists" to the ALRB upon notice that a labor organization in-
tended to organize their agricultural employees. Also, the employers
were found to have committed unfair labor practices when they
wrongfully interrogated their employees as to their union sympa-
thies. The employers contended on appeal that the ALRB had no au-
thority to promulgate the "prepetition employee list" requirement,
and that a showing of actual effect on identifiable employees was re-
quired to establish unfair labor practices.
The supreme court held that the ALRB did in fact have authority
to promulgate the "prepetition list" requirement, as it had the statu-
tory power to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). As one of the rights
34. Id. at 576-77, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
35. 37 Cal. 3d at 197-200, 689 P.2d at 140-42, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 568-70. See Laughran
& Laughran, Property and Inheritance Rights of Putative Spouses in California: Se-
lected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 11 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 45 (1977).
36. 37 Cal. 3d at 197, 689 P.2d at 140, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
37. Id.
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granted employees by the ALRA was the right to organize or join la-
bor organizations, it was reasonably necessary to require employers
to provide the lists to facilitate the organization. The court further
drew upon the fact that the federal labor relations act requires such
lists from employers when union elections are called, and has done so
for nearly twenty years.
The court also rejected the contention that a showing of actual ef-
fect on identifiable employees was necessary to establish violations of
the ALRA. The court drew upon the corresponding section of the
National Labor Relations Act, which proscribes a wide range of em-
ployer conduct. The test for a violation of the NLRA is two-fold.
First, it is only necessary to show that an employer's actions would
tend to coerce a reasonable employee, and second, it is sufficient to
show that effect. It is not necessary to show the employer intended
to produce the effect. Thus, a particularized showing of intent and
effect was unnecessary. As a result, the ALRB's findings and reme-
dial order were sustained.
XII. LAND USE
California Coastal Act does not preclude public
referendum on local land use measures: Yost v. Thomas.
In Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d 1152, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801
(1984), the supreme court was asked to decide whether the California
Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977),
preempted the power of referendum. The court concluded that it did
not.
The petitioners appealed from the trial court's denial of their writ
of mandate to compel the Santa Barbara city clerk to process a refer-
endum petition opposing resolutions and an ordinance adopted by the
city council affecting the coastal zone. The appellees contended that
the clerk need not have processed the petitions since the actions of
the city council were pursuant to authority delegated by the state,
were administrative, and were immune from referendum. The au-
thority delegated to the city council derived from the California
Coastal Act of 1976. A ruling that the exercise of such authority by
the city council was beyond referendum would in effect be a state-
ment that the Coastal Act preempts the exercise of the power of
referendum.
The supreme court held that the Coastal Act did not in fact pre-
empt the exercise of the power of referendum, and the trial court
was directed to issue a writ of mandate ordering the clerk to process
the petitions and place the referendum on the ballot. In so holding,
the court determined that the legislature did not intend for the
Coastal Act to preempt local planning authority either expressly or
impliedly since it was intended that each community would autono-
mously propose its own land use plan and submit the proposed plan
to the coastal commission for approval. The commission merely had
discretion to approve or disapprove proposals based on standards set
forth in the act. Communities may conform to those standards or be
more restrictive in their approach.
Since wide discretion was left to local government to determine
and implement land use plans, any actions taken by such govern-
ments would be legislative in nature rather than administrative.
Legislative actions are subject to the power of referendum. Since the
city council's resolutions and ordinance were legislative and subject
to that power, the Santa Barbara city clerk erred in failing to process
the referendum petitions.
XIII. LIBEL
Actual malice does not exist where the source of the
author's information is reputable: Reader's Digest
Association v. Superior Court.
In Reader's Digest Association v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 690
P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1984), (see Mitchell v. Superior Court, 12
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 837 (1985)), a unanimous court affirmed the im-
portance of literary license to a competent and free press.
A foundation established for the rehabilitation of drug addicts and
its founder filed a defamation suit against a magazine company and
its employee for publishing an article concerning the foundation.
The article was based upon the critical observations of two authors
who were awarded the Pulitzer Prize for their series of reports and
articles about the foundation. Although the article contained many
serious allegations against the foundation, the plaintiffs' suit only al-
leged that three sentences in the article were defamatory. These
sentences arguably stated that the plaintiffs had never been success-
ful in rehabilitating drug addicts and that the foundation's publicity
concerning its success rate was a fraudulent attempt to further the
personal interests of the individual plaintiffs.
The supreme court first concluded that the plaintiffs were public
figures since they had engaged in massive publicity and self-promo-
tion efforts. Thus, the court applied the standard of actual malice. It
concluded that the defendants had not entertained serious doubt as
to the reliability of the sources or the truth of the challenged state-
ments. None of the alleged defamatory statements were beyond
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what a responsible staff writer might write on the basis of informa-
tion provided to him by persons of good and distinguished reputation.
Accordingly, the supreme court issued a writ of mandate ordering
the trial court to vacate its order denying the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion.
xiv. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
City council must "meet and confer" with employee
representatives before proposing charter amendments
affecting public employment: People ex reL Seal Beach
Police Officers Association v. City of Seal Beach.
In People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Association v. City of
Seal Beach, 36 Cal. 3d 591, 685 P.2d 1145, 205 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1984), the
supreme court was asked to decide whether the city council of a char-
ter city must "meet and confer" with representatives of city workers
before it proposes an amendment to the city charter concerning the
terms and conditions of public employment.
In 1977, the voters of the City of Seal Beach approved three
amendments which dealt with "terms and conditions" of public em-
ployment. The Seal Beach City Council proposed the amendments
without conferring with representatives of the city's employees.
Several public employee unions sought to have the amendments
declared invalid by reason of non-compliance with California Gover-
ment Code section 3505. Section 3505 requires "[t]he governing body
of a public agency . . .to meet and confer [with representatives of
employee organizations] in good faith regarding wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment ... and [to] consider fully
such presentations as are made by the employee organization . ..
prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action."
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West 1980).
In response, the City advanced two defenses: first, it argued the
"meet and confer" requirement of section 3505 was incompatible with
the power granted to the City under article XI, section 3, subdivision
(b) of the California Constitution. Second, the City argued that Cali-
fornia Government Code section 3504 exempted it from the "meet
and confer" requirements.
Although the supreme court did concede that article XI, section 3,
subdivision (b) of the California Constitution grants the governing
body of a charter city the right to propose charter amendments to its
electorate, the court was quick to add that "few legal rights are so
'absolute and untrammeled' that they can never be subjected to
peaceful coexistence with other rules." The "meet and confer" re-
quirement, the purpose of which is to foster better employer-em-
ployee relations, is a matter of statewide importance and cannot be
overshadowed by a city's right to carry out its democratic functions.
No actual conflict existed between the city council's power to pro-
pose charter amendments and section 3505. At most, section 3505
was a minor inconvenience upon a city council's constitutional gov-
erning powers, as the City retained the ultimate power to make its
own independent decisions.
The court also held that the City was not exempt under section
3504 as this argument was inconsistent with section 3504's legislative
intent to forestall any expansion of the language of "wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment" to include more gen-
eral managerial policy decisions.
Accordingly, the supreme court directed the trial court to enter an
order overruling the city council's demurrer.
XV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Statute denying subrogation for a collateral source in a
medical malpractice suit held constitutional: Barme v.
Wood.
Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816
(1984), resolved the second in an expected string of challenges to the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA).
MICRA was passed during the medical malpractice insurance "crisis"
of the mid-1970's. At the time, increasing insurance rates were
blamed for rising costs of health care and for causing some physicians
to practice without malpractice insurance.
Among MICRA's provisions was a limitation on damages a plaintiff
could be awarded where he was covered by collateral sources
(sources of insurance coverage or other benefits to which the plaintiff
has a right in addition to his claim against the defendant). Specifi-
cally, Civil Code section 3333.1(a) allows a health care provider de-
fendant to introduce evidence of benefits the plaintiff received from
collateral sources to compensate her for her injury. Subsection (b)
denies a collateral source the right to be subrogated to the plaintiff's
position in an action against the defendant for benefits paid. Barme
involved a challenge to subsection (b) only.
The plaintiff, a Huntington Park police officer, suffered a heart at-
tack while on duty. He underwent open heart surgery and suffered
brain damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the health care
providers performing the surgery. The City, a self-insured workers'
compensation provider, paid benefits to Barme and intervened in
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Barme's suit against the health care provider defendants. The City
sought to be subrogated to Barme's rights against the defendants for
that which it paid by way of workers' compensation. The defendants
were granted summary judgment against the City from which the
City appealed.
The City of Huntington Park argued that Civil Code section
3333.1(b) constituted a due process violation because it arbitrarily
eliminated the City's right to subrogation and bore no rational rela-
tion to a legitimate public purpose. The City unsuccessfully con-
tended that the statute merely shifted the cost of medical malpractice
insurance from negligent health care providers to innocent employ-
ers and their insurers. The City also argued that the statute violated
equal protection provisions because it conferred on health care pro-
vider defendants benefits not shared by other tort defendants,
thereby burdening collateral sources forced to pay benefits to those
injured at the hand of health care provider defendants.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court closely adhered to
its reasoning in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,
36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984), in which it
found that the portion of MICRA permitting periodic payments of
medical malpractice damages in excess of $50,000.00, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 667.7 (West 1980), did not violate either due process or equal
protection rights of plaintiffs.
In rejecting the due process argument, the court applied the ra-
tional basis test as it had in American Bank, and held that the legis-
lature could have concluded that eliminating collateral source
subrogation rights would lower malpractice insurance rates by reduc-
ing defendants' potential liability. Likewise, the court noted that the
statute can still be rationally related to the objective of reducing mal-
practice insurance rates even though the practical effect may only be
to redistribute the burden among insurers; such redistribution could,
in itself, be a legitimate goal. The legislature is not required to ap-
portion liability on the basis of fault, as the court might be.
The court summarily disposed of the City's equal protection argu-
ment by restating, in essence, its American Bank argument that the
legislature is entitled to deal with evils that it sees on a piecemeal ba-
sis if it so chooses. The legislature saw the need for medical malprac-
tice insurance reform and countered with MICRA; it was not
obligated to go further in taming the rising costs of society's other
ills.
In dissent, Justice Mosk opined that the statute does not even pass
the rational relation standard and is a violation of due process and
equal protection. He urged that the statute's effect was to pass the
burden of health care providers' negligence on to third parties, pri-
marily the victim and her employer or its workers' compensation car-
rier. Justice Mosk suggested that it would be far more reasonable for
the tortfeasor's carrier to shoulder the burden of the negligence than
to pass it on to the employer or its carrier. He also suggested that the
majority may have been somewhat short-sighted in approving of the
legislation. Noting the increasing costs of workers' compensation,
even during the malpractice insurance crisis, Justice Mosk said that
placing an additional burden on workers' compensation carriers abro-
gated the goal of gaining greater health care for Californians.
XVI. RENT CONTROL
Ordinance requiring a permit to demolish an apartment
building held not a deprivation of due process: Nash v.
City of Santa Monica.
In Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207
Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1740 (1985), the
supreme court considered the validity of an ordinance in a city char-
ter which prohibited removal of rental units from the housing mar-
ket by conversion or demolition absent a removal permit from the
City's Rent Control Board.
A residential landlord who did not qualify for a permit to demolish
his building petitioned for a writ of mandate. The trial court held the
ordinance constituted a deprivation of property without due process
of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California
Constitution.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision by applying
the traditional tests used to determine the validity of economic regu-
lations. It held that the impact of the ordinance on the landlord was
outweighed by the relationship of that provision to the objectives of
the rent control ordinance. All regulation of property entails some
limitation upon the liberty of the owner. Although the landlord
could not demolish his building, the ordinance was only an indirect
and minimal burden imposed upon the landlord's asserted liberty in-
terest. The landlord was not being restricted from netting a fair re-
turn on his investment in the property since the building was
occupied. On the other hand, demolishing the building would have a
severe impact on the city's housing shortage.
Inasmuch as the ordinance was reasonably related to the legitimate
goal of maintaining adequate housing, and the relationship of the or-
dinance was both "real and substantial," the supreme court deter-
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mined the ordinance was constitutionally sound, thereby reversing
the trial court's decision.
XVII. TORTS
Trial court erred in granting nonsuit in wrongful death
action against city, builder, and homeowner's association
for causing automobile accident by maintaining an
address sign which allegedly obstructed decedent's view of
traffic: Carson v. Facilities Development Co.
Carson v. Facilities Development Co., 36 Cal. 3d 830, 686 P.2d 656,
206 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984), was a wrongful death and personal injury
lawsuit brought by the decedent's surviving husband and children.
The decedent was killed, and her children injured, when her car was
struck by another vehicle while she attempted to make a left turn.
Suit was brought against the driver of the other car for driving in a
negligent manner. The plaintiffs also sued the City of San Diego
(City), Facilities Development Company (FDC), and the Friars
Hollow Homeowners Association (Friars Hollow), claiming that an
address sign for the Friars Hollow condominiums erected by FDC on
City property adjacent to the intersection obstructed the decedent's
view and caused the fatal accident. Judgments of nonsuit were en-
tered on behalf of the City, FDC, and Friars Hollow at the close of
the plaintiff's case. At the end of the trial, the jury found in favor of
the defendant driver.
The main issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
granting nonsuit in favor of the three defendants. The supreme court
reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
concluded that the trial court had in fact erred.
The plaintiff's action against the City was based on Government
Code section 835. The City presented three arguments in support of
the trial court's judgment: 1) the City was not liable under section
835 since it did not erect the sign, 2) the City had no notice of the
sign's existence; and 3) the plaintiffs failed to use expert testimony to
prove that the sign constituted a dangerous condition.
The court rejected each argument in turn. First, it made no differ-
ence that the City had not erected the sign since the city property at
issue was the intersection which was made dangerous by the sign.
The City's liability could be based on the dangerous condition of the
intersection, even though the sign which made the intersection dan-
gerous was on adjacent property and was not owned by the City. Sec-
ond, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have
determined that the City had constructive notice of the sign and the
dangerous condition it created. Finally, lay witnesses were compe-
tent to testify that a driver's view would be obstructed by the sign
when making a left turn.
The court also rejected the arguments presented by FDC and Fri-
ars Hollow. Their argument against non-expert testimony was
quickly rejected on the same grounds as the City's argument. Next,
the court determined that the trial court could not find as a matter of
law that the sign did not cause the accident. Finally, there was also
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Friars
Hollow was responsible for the obstructing sign, even though FDC
had erected the sign on city property.
Since the plaintiffs' evidence would support a verdict for the plain-
tiffs, the supreme court reversed the judgments in favor of the City,
FDC, and Friars Hollow. The judgment in favor of the other driver
was affirmed.
XVIII. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
A. Employee who wishes to accompany a nonmarital
partner to another state in order to maintain family
relationship with their child has good cause to leave
employment: MacGregor v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board.
In MacGregor v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 37 Cal.
3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984), the supreme court de-
termined that a worker who leaves her employment to accompany
her "nonmarital partner" to another state in order to preserve the fa-
milial relationship they have established with their child is deemed
to have met the good cause requirement of California Unemployment
Insurance Code section 1256 if compelling circumstances are present.
The court, recognizing the importance of the fundamental familial
relationship created when two parents establish a home for their nat-
ural child, looked beyond whether or not the parents were legally
married. Where a nonmarital relationship exists, a party may receive
unemployment benefits if substantial, credible, and competent evi-
dence demonstrates an established family unit consisting of the natu-
ral parents and their child, and that the party chose to relocate in
order to preserve the family unit. In addition to evidence that the ap-
pellant and her mate had maintained a common household for over
two years prior to the birth of their child, evidence that the parents
received the child into their home when she was born and was given
the father's surname at birth further served to persuade the court
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that compelling circumstances existed which justified the appellant's
departure from her job.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's order
that the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reconsider its deci-
sion and award benefits to the applicant if she met the other eligibil-
ity requirements.
B. Employee who is subjected to a continuing course of
illegal discrimination by an employer has "good cause"
to resign if he has reasonable belief that the
discrimination will continue as long as his
employment continues: Sanchez v. Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board.
Suppose an employee in the face of continuing harassment and
threatened dismissal in retaliation for her union activities and "whis-
tle blowing" to public authorities quits her job in anticipation of be-
ing fired. Is the employee rendered ineligible for unemployment
benefits under California Unemployment Insurance Code section
1256? This issue presented itself in Sanchez v. Unemployment Insur-
ance Appeals Board, 36 Cal. 3d 575, 685 P.2d 61, 205 Cal. Rptr. 501
(1984), and was answered in the negative.
The appellants, two women, were employed by the respondent, a
publicly-funded and privately-operated non-profit corporation. Gov-
ernment investigations into the respondent's handling of government
funds revealed mismanagement and misuse of public funds in addi-
tion to numerous other employee violations. This led to termination
of its government funding. The appellants were instrumental in al-
erting state and federal agencies to these abuses, and were also active
union officials.
As a result of the appellants' activities, the respondent's president
embarked on a plan to gather enough evidence that would warrant
the appellants' termination. The appellants were aware of this
scheme to have them fired.
Over a short period of time, one of the appellants was repri-
manded, harassed and placed under continuing surveillance in retali-
ation for her union activities. Rather than wait for her termination,
she resigned.
The other appellant witnessed the systematic harassment of her
fellow union officials. Realizing that she had become the prime tar-
get of the president's antiunion animus, upon the other appellant's
resignation, she also resigned.
The appellants' claims for unemployment compensation were de-
nied by the Unemployment Appeals Board. The Board's decision was
affirmed by the superior court inasmuch as it was determined both
had voluntarily quit their jobs without the good cause required in
Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.
The supreme court determined that the administrative denials of
the appellants' claims for unemployment compensation were based
upon the legally erroneous standard that a worker about to be dis-
charged for cause may not anticipate a discharge and still collect un-
employment benefits. Instead, the court held, an employee who is
subject to a continuing course of illegal discrimination by an em-
ployer and who reasonably believes such discrimination will continue
as long as employment continues, has "good cause" to leave employ-
ment voluntarily under the terms of section 1256.
Under this new rule, the appellants were entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation. The judgment was reversed and the trial court
was directed to issue its writ of mandate ordering the respondent to
pay the appellants their unemployment benefits.
XIX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Employee has right to award of reasonable costs incurred
in answering an employer's petition for writ of review
denied by appellate court: Johnson v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board.
In Johnson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 37 Cal. 3d
235, 689 P.2d 1127, 207 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1984), the supreme court was
asked to decide whether an employee could be granted reasonable
costs by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board incurred in an-
swering a petition for writ of review sought by an employer which
was denied. In holding that such an award was available, the court
liberally construed the Workers' Compensation Act in order to give
maximum benefits to injured workers. Allowing the board of appeals
to grant costs was consistent with such a construction.
Arthur Johnson was injured while employed by Trans-World Air-
lines (TWA) in 1972 and 1977. He applied to the Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeals Board for adjudication of his permanent disability
claims. In 1981, the judge issued Johnson awards which he disputed
as insufficient. His appeal was then heard and the relief he sought
was granted. An insurance carrier for TWA filed a petition for writ
of review in the court of appeal which was answered by Johnson.
Johnson's answer requested a remand to the Appeals Board for an
award of attorney's fees incurred in opposing the petition. As author-
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ity for the request, Johnson cited California Labor Code section 5801
which requires a court reviewing a petition for review to remand the
cause to the appeals board to make a supplemental award of attor-
ney's fees should the reviewing court find no reasonable basis for the
petition. The court of appeal denied both the petition of the insurer
and Johnson's request for costs. Johnson petitioned the appeals
board for an award and was denied there. He then petitioned the
court of appeal to order the insurer to reimburse him for printing
costs. The court denied the petition and Johnson appealed to the
supreme court.
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board may award costs as
provided in section 5811 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Act
does not clearly define whether such costs may properly include costs
of defending against a petition in an appellate court since section 5811
contemplates awards of costs incurred in actions before the board
itself.
Historically, the board itself had defended its awards in appellate
review. No costs would therefore be incurred by employees. This
policy was changed, however, leaving employees to fend for them-
selves. The supreme court reasoned that it would be unfair to place
the burden of cost on the employee. The California Constitution
gave the legislature the right to administer workers' compensation
legislation "without encumbrance of any character." CAL. CONST.
art. XIV, § 4. To force workers to absorb the costs of defending peti-
tions would diminish their awards and frustrate the constitutional
intent.
Further, section 5811 awards costs in actions "before the appeals
board." The court reasoned that actions before the board do not
cease until an appellate court grants a petition for review; when such
petitions are denied, the action remains before the board. Given the
liberal construction to be afforded the Act, the award of costs would
therefore be available, as the action was "before the appeals board."
Thus, Johnson could recover the $531.93 cost incurred in printing his
answer.
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